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PART I.

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING

NEGOTIATIONS WITH FRANCE RELATING TO PENDING QUESTIONS IN AFRICA.

1894.

TABLE OF CONTENTS.

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
1	To Marquis of Dufferin	300 A	Aug. 14, 1894	Authorizes him to enter into negotiations with French Government respecting pending questions	1
2	Marquis of Dufferin ..	209	16,	French Government asked if they would recognize British influence in Upper Nile Valley, provided rights of Egypt and Porte were properly safeguarded	2
3	Mr. Phipps ..	223	Sept. 5,	Conversation with M. Hanotaux on pending questions, especially the Say-Barruwa line and the question of the Nile watershed ..	3
4	To Mr. Phipps ..	330	14,	Points out error in M. Hanotaux' language (see No. 3). Northern limit of British sphere defined in Article II of Anglo-Congolese Agreement	6
5	Mr. Phipps ..	232 Confidential	13,	Conversation with M. Hanotaux. What adequate compensation would Her Majesty's Government give if France recognized British sphere of influence in Nile Valley? Touches on Borgu question	7
6	Minute by Sir P. Anderson	..	19,	Her Majesty's Government unable to take responsibility of stopping Captain Lugard's expedition	8
7	Mr. Phipps ..	247	22,	Further conversation respecting Nile Valley and wishes of Her Majesty's Government. Also touches on question of commercial concessions in Sierra Leone	9
8	,, ,, ..	250 Confidential	26,	M. Hanotaux hopes neither country would follow a "politique à surprises." Reported expeditions to Tuat by French, and Nile Valley by Colonel Colvile, disavowed ..	11
9	,, ,, ..	255 Confidential	29,	As to compensation demanded by France for British sphere in East Africa. Discusses question as to southernmost limit of Egypt proper	12
10	,, ,, ..	256	29,	Discussion respecting spheres of influence in West Africa. Say-Barruwa line and "Hinterlands" of Ashanti and Dahomey .	13
11	,, ,, ..	257 Confidential	30,	Asks he may be allowed to produce or cite Treaties with Niger Chiefs to refute views put forward by French Colonial Office ..	15
12	,, , ..	48 Telegraphic	Oct. 2,	If Her Majesty's Government allow French sphere east of Dahomey to be prolonged north to 12th parallel, M. Hanotaux will try and put pressure on French Colonial party ..	15
13	To Mr. Phipps ..	57 Telegraphic	4,	What would, in that event, happen in regard to Nile Basin? (see No. 12)	16
14	Mr. Phipps ..	260 Most Conf.	4,	No progress made. As to Say-Barruwa line and French desires to extend the east boundary of Dahomey	16
15	,, ,, ..	261	4,	M. Hanotaux hopes Her Majesty's Government will accept mountains north of Gottogo as our Ashanti boundary (see No. 12) ..	17
16	,, ,, ..	49 Telegraphic	5,	Probably France would engage not to advance beyond Congo watershed, if Her Majesty's Government would agree not to advance beyond posts already occupied into sphere under discussion (see No. 13)	18
17	To Mr. Phipps ..	58 Telegraphic	5,	Niger Company would accept 12th parallel as French east boundary of Dahomey if Say-Barruwa line agreed to by France ..	18
18	Mr. Phipps ..	263 Very Conf.	5,	Conversation respecting Nile Basin, and probable bases of agreement on the question ..	19
18*	,, ,, ..	51 Telegraphic	8,	Can Her Majesty's Government produce Treaty with Nikki?	20
19	To Mr. Phipps ..	59 Telegraphic	8,	Answer to No. 18* in affirmative. Sultan of Borgu lives at Nikki and Boussa ..	20
20	Mr. Phipps ..	266 Confidential	9,	Discussion with MM. Hanotaux and Haussmann on pending questions (see No. 1). Project of bases for settlement of ..	20

No.	Name.	No.	Date.	Subject.	Page
21	To Mr. Phipps ..	60 Telegraphic	Oct. 10, 1894	Should find out what M. Hanotaux means by the self-denying proposition (see No. 18) ..	24
22	Mr. Phipps ..	270 Confidential	11,	Forwards letter from M. Hanotaux, with observations on it respecting African questions (see No. 20)	25
23	,, ,, ..	Private	15,	Reviews present position of negotiations, dealing chiefly with Nikki, Say-Barruwa line, and Upper Nile questions	27
24	,, ,, ..	280 Confidential	24,	Conversation with M. Hanotaux respecting alleged French action in Egypt (see No. 22)	29
25	Memorandum by Sir P. Anderson	..	Nov. 2,	Memorandum respecting "confines of Egypt," referred to in Article I of Anglo-Congolese Agreement	30
26	To Marquis of Dufferin	390	3,	Agreement should be come to as to Nile sphere before further discussing West African questions, but should press question on M. Hanotaux if he seems inclined to leave it (see Nos. 7 and 18)	30
27	,, ,,	391	5,	Authorizing to proceed with negotiations for delimiting Sierra Leone boundary (see Nos. 20 and 26)	31
28	Marquis of Dufferin ..	293 Confidential	7,	Conversation with M. Hanotaux. No progress made. M. Hanotaux refuses to grant Her Majesty's Government anything in the east if concessions are made to France in the west (see No. 26)	32
29	,, ,, ..	296 Confidential	9,	Transmits despatch from Mr. Phipps respecting M. Hanotaux' proposal respecting possible Sself-denying Agreement between Great Britain and France	34
30	,, ,, ..	309	26,	French Government ready to proceed with delimitation of Sierra Leone boundary (see No. 27)	35
31	To Marquis of Dufferin	415	30,	Her Majesty's Government only ready to proceed with delimitation of the frontier referred to in Article II, Annex I, of Arrangement of 10th August, 1889 (see No. 30)	36
32	Marquis of Dufferin ..	318	Dec. 5,	Has informed M. Hanotaux of substance of No. 31. M. Hanotaux quite satisfied ..	36

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Correspondence respecting Negotiations with France relating to pending Questions in Africa.

PART I.

No. 1.

The Earl of Kimberley to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 300 A. Africa.)

My Lord, *Foreign Office, August* 14, 1894.

HER Majesty's Government are ready, as you are already aware, to enter into discussion with the French Government on the various questions (apart from that of Egypt) pending between Great Britain and France in East and West Africa.

An instruction has already been given to you with regard to the Agreement between Great Britain and Italy for the demarcation of their respective spheres of influence in Somaliland.

The other questions which remain unsettled are:—

1. The claim of compensation to the French missionaries in Uganda on account of their losses during the fighting between the Protestant and Catholic sections of the Waganda.

2. The settlement of the boundary between the British and French territories in the neighbourhood of Sierra Leone.

3. The questions arising out of the collision between the British force dispatched from Sierra Leone and the French force under Lieutenant Maritz, and the collisions near the mouth of the Scarcies.

4. The delimitation between the British and French spheres to the west of the Niger.

5. The final settlement of the Say–Barruwa line under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1890; and

6. Questions relative to the proceedings of M. Mizon in the neighbourhood of that line.

Your Excellency is authorized to say that if a satisfactory arrangement is come to with regard to the British sphere in the Nile watershed, Her Majesty's Government will be prepared on all of these questions to meet the French Government in a most conciliatory spirit.

As regards 1, though not admitting any liability, nor that the amount of actual losses of the missionaries has been satisfactorily proved, nor that they suffered any wrong at the hands of the British authorities, Her Majesty's Government would be prepared, in consideration of the fact that the missionaries undoubtedly suffered losses and inconvenience in consequence of the war, to grant to them an indemnity of 10,000*l*.

2. As regards Sierra Leone, they would be prepared to accept a line of frontier in the neighbourhood of the Upper Niger, which would place, not only Heremakuno, but the whole of the western watershed of the river, from the 10th parallel to the Franco-

Liberian boundary in the latitude of Tembe Kunda, within the French sphere. In view, however, of this important concession, it would be necessary that Kalieri, which is outside the watershed, should remain on the British side. As regards the remainder of the frontier the line has been practically fixed in previous negotiations.

3. Looking to the grave doubts which exist as to the position of Waima, Her Majesty's Government will not press for compensation in regard to the unfortunate mistake which led to the loss there of several lives on both sides, but they must claim some compensation to the families of the labourers who were shot down by the French gendarmerie at N'compah.

4. Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to meet the wish of the French Government to obtain the means of communication between their newly acquired Colony of Dahomey and their sphere in the neighbourhood of the Upper Niger without passing through the territory of other Powers.

In order to enable this object to be attained, Her Majesty's Government would make a substantial concession of territory. The French Government are aware that, under Treaties with Borgu or Barba, the whole of the territory comprised in and dependent on that Sultanate has been for a considerable time within the British sphere. The "Hinterland" of Dahomey is thus closed to French expansion in the interior. Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to grant a line of the nature indicated in the annexed map, which, placing on the French side an important portion of Borgu and its dependencies, would give to the French free communication between Dahomey and the French sphere west of and bordering on the Niger. This concession would be dependent upon a recognition by the French Government that the Anglo-French Agreement of 1890, while leaving for the present undefined the northern frontier of Sokoto, placed within the British sphere Bornu south of the line of latitude between Say and Barruwa; and also upon the recognition, as to the eastern frontier of the British sphere east of the Niger, of the lines indicated in the Anglo-German Agreements of 1886 and 1893.

It would be understood that the discussion respecting M. Mizon's action would be dropped on both sides.

Her Majesty's Government hope that, if these territorial questions are satisfactorily settled, M. Hanotaux will be prepared to act upon the promise which he has given to Mr. Phipps as to an arrangement between the two Governments on the subject of commercial relations between the British and French territories in the Sierra Leone and Porto Novo districts, and upon other matters in which British commercial bodies are interested, especially the employment without restriction of Kroo labourers, and the modification of the recent policy under which, in Assinie and elsewhere, established British trade is being injuriously affected by the grant of monopolies to French firms.

I am, &c.

(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 2.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received August 17.)

(No. 209. Africa.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 16, 1894.

I WAITED upon M. Hanotaux by appointment at half-past 3 to-day.

I began the conversation by observing that his recent negotiations with the King of the Belgians and the agreement arrived at with His Majesty had so changed the face of Congolese affairs since his note of the 7th instant had been written, that he probably did not expect it to be answered; nor, indeed, had your Lordship instructed me to reply to it, though in a despatch addressed to myself you had dealt to a certain extent with the arguments which it contained. Of this document I merely gave him a short summary, as I knew it was not your Lordship's desire to rekindle the ashes of an extinguished controversy.

I then touched upon the main purport of my visit, namely, the arrangements which, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, it would be equally in the interest of England and of France to make in respect of all outstanding questions, both in the East and West of Africa. Her Majesty's Government, I observed, were under the impression, from the reports of what had already passed between himself and Mr. Phipps, that his Excellency would not be unprepared to recognize the sphere of English influence established in the Upper Nile Valley under the Anglo-German

Agreement of 1890, provided the rights of Egypt and the Porte were properly safeguarded. Your Lordship considered that this had been already done by the terms of the Anglo-Congolese Convention of the 12th May, but, with a view of meeting the wishes of the French Government, you were quite ready to apply to what were formerly the Equatorial Provinces of Egypt the same formula that had been framed with respect to the occupation of Kassala by the Italians, as cited in M. Decrais' note of the 7th instant. Furthermore, I added, we were anxious to show an equally conciliatory spirit in respect of all the other African questions which had formed the subject of debate during recent years between the two Governments, such as the sum of money to be awarded to the Catholic Missionaries for their alleged losses during the troubles in Uganda, &c., as well as to consult the convenience of the French by allowing them to connect their territories on the Niger with the Hinterland of Dahomey, provided, of course, there was an equal disposition on their part to meet us half-way on other points.

M. Hanotaux expressed in courteous terms his sense of the friendly spirit evinced by my communication, and observed that he welcomed our proposals with the greatest cordiality, but that for the moment I could hardly expect to be given a categorical reply. He himself had been ordered to repair to Vichy without a day's delay; all the other Ministers were out of town, nor had he had an opportunity of consulting any of them since the signing of the Franco-Congolese Agreement. On the 30th August, however, he would be back from Vichy, and on that day there would be a meeting of the Council of Ministers, by which time he hoped he would be in a position to convey an answer to your Lordship.

Although your Lordship will be somewhat disappointed at the matter being thus postponed, especially as by the end of the month Her Majesty's Ministers will themselves be probably dispersed, it was obviously no good pressing for a speedier treatment of the question, but before taking my leave I thought it well to observe that if the French Government did not find itself in a position to accept our offers, we should then of course be free to resume our liberty of action. We had been in no sense parties to the arrangement arrived at between France and the King of the Belgians, though, under the circumstances, your Lordship had not felt yourself called upon to oppose His Majesty's desire to sign the document to which that Agreement had been consigned. Moreover, as it would appear that France now claimed the whole of the Congo Riverine system north of the limit recently assigned to the Congo State as within her sphere of influence, we were entitled to demand the recognition of our contiguous rights of jurisdiction.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

No. 3.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received September 8.)

(No. 223. Africa.)
My Lord, *Paris, September* 5, 1894.

WHEN I called on the Minister for Foreign Affairs this afternoon I said to him, after a few introductory remarks, that as Her Majesty's Ambassador had already laid before him the proposals of Her Majesty's Government relating to the recognition by France of the British spheres of influence in the Upper Nile Valley, I would at once enumerate to him the solutions which Her Majesty's Government proposed to offer as regarded the various pending questions between the two countries.

1. As regarded the compensation to be awarded to the Catholic missionaries for their alleged losses in Uganda, I reminded M. Hanotaux of the various communications which had passed between your Lordship and the French Ambassador, during the course of the last of which you had declared that it was not possible to exceed a sum of 125,000 fr. Now, however, Her Majesty's Government were prepared to fix the sum at 10,000*l*.

M. Hanotaux said that, presuming we were able to arrive at a comprehensive settlement of all the various questions, he was prepared to regard the proposed indemnity of 10,000*l*. as a fair one. Whether the sum paid were 5,000*l*. more or less did not much matter provided Her Majesty's Government agreed to the indemnity in principle on the terms mentioned.

2. As to the line of frontier in the rear of Sierra Leone, I recapitulated the various points on which we had already arrived at an agreement. But from the 10th parallel we were now prepared to assent to the distinct geographical line which had been originally proposed by Colonels Archinard and Combes, a line which would obviate all disputes in the future. Kalieri, however, as being outside the watershed, would remain to Great Britain. It was under the control of a Soulimah Chief, and its assignment to France would destroy the principle of a natural frontier. France, however, would obtain a considerable tract of country not hitherto contemplated.

His Excellency said the concession would be a satisfactory one; he had always indorsed the principle of natural frontiers, but he must admit he had resigned himself to accepting the 10-kilom. line to which Sir A. Hemming had attached such importance.

3. On my referring to the settlement proposed by Her Majesty's Government of the questions arising out of the various collisions last winter, his Excellency said that he had understood from M. Decrais that they were already dropped. I remarked that that was not, according to my information, strictly the case. The doubts as to the position of Waima were, owing to various difficulties, not yet cleared up; but in spite of the great loss of British lives we were prepared, as an evidence of good-will, not to pursue the question further. As regarded, however, the collision at N'Compah, when peaceable, unarmed natives, occupied in road-making, were shot down without warning by the French gendarmes, Her Majesty's Government could not doubt that the French Government would accord compensation to the innocent families of the sufferers. Such compensation would doubtless not be considerable, but would be just.

M. Hanotaux said that it would be doubtless necessary to compare the narratives of the alleged circumstances as given on each side. That must be a matter for future examination.

4. I then explained to M. Hanotaux the concession offered by Her Majesty's Government as regarded the delimitation of the spheres of influence to the west of the Niger. His Excellency had, last spring, indicated to me the importance to France of securing a direct communication through French territory between Kong and Mossi and the newly acquired French Colony of Dahomey. I had then pointed out to him that such proposed communication would be across a part of Borgu which was in the British sphere. Her Majesty's Government were now prepared to accede to his desire.

M. Hanotaux reminded me that after the successful Dahomey expedition he had pointed out to me that the French Government put forward far larger claims as regarded the "Hinterland" of that Colony.

I replied that such claims would be untenable since all French expansion in such direction was precluded, not only by the existence of the Anglo-German neutral zone, but by our Treaties with Borgu.

M. Hanotaux declared that the French Government had also Treaties with the Borgu Chiefs, but admitted after some discussion that the proposal of Her Majesty's Government involved an important concession which he would convey at once to the Colonial authorities.

5. The conversation on the above question naturally led to that in connection with it, namely, the recognition of the Say-Barruwa line. M. Hanotaux again renewed the arguments which he had employed during our discussions last spring, obviously evoking from me arguments similar to those which I had then employed. His Excellency observed that he could not see in what respect I was now making any concession. I was, on the contrary, asking for the most strained interpretation of the Treaty. I replied that I now contemplated none, I was merely insisting on the acceptance of the common-sense interpretation of the terms of a Treaty concluded between the two countries, which provided that the line should be drawn in such a manner as to comprise in the sphere of action of the Niger Company "all that fairly belongs to the Kingdom of Sokoto." M. Hanotaux said that I insisted on even more than a straight line drawn from Say to Barruwa. Did I regard Gandu as a portion of Sokoto? I replied that Gandu was south of the straight line, and therefore without the French sphere; if, however, M. Monteil could afford convincing proofs that the districts marked on the map as Adar Gaber, Hammadu, and "Independent Pagan Tribes" were not portions of Sokoto they could not be

claimed by us. The map I exhibited to him was marked, I said, "drawn apparently before the publication of the Anglo-German Agreement;" he must not, therefore, consider that we irrevocably had fixed a line. I also referred to the closing line of the British sphere south-eastwards. His Excellency said that he would talk over this proposal with the Colonial Department.

6. I then came to the Mizon question, and to the proposed abandonment of the discussion respecting that officer's action.

Without making the reference which I apprehended to the seizure of the "Sergent Malamine," M. Hanotaux merely observed, somewhat plaintively, that I expected then that all M. Mizon's Treaties should be set aside.

On concluding the above enumerations of questions, M. Hanotaux embarked on the question of the Nile watershed. Her Majesty's Government were asking, he said, for a great concession from France in this respect. The Treaty with Germany of 1890, and the Convention simultaneously concluded with Italy and the Congo State, to which I had made reference, were not merely acts concluded by those Powers to recognize the British sphere. Very large concessions had been made by Great Britain in each case. Besides the cession of Heligoland to Germany, other concessions had been made to that Power. Italy had been granted a free hand at Kassala, in Abyssinia, and elsewhere. The Congo State had been given access to the lakes. All this had been done without consulting France. His Excellency could not see in all I had been enumerating any concession, any bait, offered to France at all in proportion with what had been granted to the Powers he had mentioned. At present, France had only recognized the possession by England of the insular portion of Zanzibar, and she was now asked to recognize all these arrangements, as well as the British sphere on the Nile watershed, without any adequate return. He was very sensible of the spirit which prompted the offer, which would facilitate, as I had observed, a direct connection between Senegambia, the Ivory Coast, the French Soudan, and Dahomey, but the offers we had made were, he repeated, hardly adequate.

I replied that at the time the arrangements to which his Excellency had alluded were made France was no near neighbour to the districts concerned, and there did not appear to exist any grounds for consulting her. If France would not recognize the British sphere in the Nile Valley, I had little doubt that Her Majesty's Government would be able to make the occupation of that territory (which his Excellency had declared to be non-existent) effective.

His Excellency smiled, and said that I was now wandering from the field of negotiation. What he proposed was to negotiate; and the first step in such sense was to ascertain for what precise sphere we wished to insure recognition. We asked for that of the British sphere of influence as defined in the Agreement with Germany of 1890. He had, during the last two or three weeks, closely studied that Convention, and he could not but regard that sphere as undefined in one direction. Article III (British spheres of influence) made the British sphere bounded to "the west by the Congo Free State and by the western watershed of the basin of the Upper Nile." But, he asked, to what point of such watershed northwards? In the preceding Article II, which laid down the British sphere, which was conterminous with that of Italy, there was a closing line northwards, but Article III established none. Where were the confines of Egypt?

I replied that the recognition we required obviously was for the sphere as far as the parallel crossing Fashoda, and I understood it was for the sphere as defined in the Anglo-Congolese Arrangement that we required the recognition of France. I reminded him, however, that we considered the rights of Egypt as being merely in suspense as regarded the whole of that sphere, referring his Excellency to the declaration made by the Marquis of Dufferin.

I, however, said that I would refer this question to your Lordship. But it is obvious to me that the boundary of the British sphere following the western watershed ends at 10°.

After referring briefly to the question of the Kroo labourers, which his Excellency declared to be easily susceptible of arrangement, M. Hanotaux said that, whilst he entirely appreciated the spirit in which Her Majesty's Government had entered upon the general negotiation—a spirit which he himself fully reciprocated—he must remind me that, anxious and even resolved as he was to arrive at an arrangement with Her Majesty's Government, he was himself more or less of a "go-between," and he would have to take into consideration and conciliate the aspirations of the Colonial party. If we arrived at an arrangement which were rejected by the French Parliament, should we have advanced matters? He must confess that at first sight he felt that we had hardly bid a price high enough for what we desired to secure. He hoped that we had not as yet said our "dernier mot."

I replied that the proposals of Her Majesty's Government were based upon the various pretensions which had been put forward on behalf of the French Government during the prolonged correspondence and discussions which had been carried on for the last two or three years, both with his Excellency's predecessors and with himself as French Commissioner on such questions. I might almost say that in many cases I feared I had pleaded the French cause in pursuing my desire to conclude them and to make acceptable offers. There were, however, other points in which a relaxation of tension favourable to a settlement might be insured. For instance, it was in no respect the desire of Her Majesty's Government to stifle the development of French Colonies. The Indian Government had been compelled for practical reasons to put obstacles in the way of the import of coolies into Réunion. From what I had learnt from your Lordship there was now every hope that this difficulty might be got over.

His Excellency said that he learnt this with much satisfaction, and it was a prospect which he would bear in mind in the negotiation.

Though I have felt it my duty to convey the fact that M. Hanotaux exhibited some disappointment at the offers of Her Majesty's Government being below his expectations, and though it was obviously necessary to go over much of the same old ground, I cannot think that time was wasted in the course of this interview, lasting an hour and a-half, and I feel that by the exercise of a little patience a solution of these first difficulties may be achieved.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 4.

The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. Phipps.

(No. 330. Africa.)
Sir,
Foreign Office, September 14, 1894.

I APPROVE the language used by you in the conversation with M. Hanotaux, reported in your despatch No. 223, Africa, of the 5th instant.

I do not propose at present to go over in detail the points raised in the discussion, preferring to await the further communication of his Excellency's views after his proposed consultation with his colleague of the Colonial Department.

I should wish, however, to call your attention to an important point, on which there seems to have been some misapprehension. His Excellency observed that Great Britain had made large concessions to Germany, Italy, and the Congo State, in order to secure their recognition of the British sphere, and that she was offering nothing to France proportionate to those concessions. He instanced the cession of Heligoland to Germany, the Kassala arrangement with Italy, and the access to the lakes given to the Congo State. To this I have to reply that in none of the three cases were those concessions made in return for recognition of the British sphere.

The cession of Heligoland was the equivalent for the recognition by Germany of the British Protectorate over Zanzibar.

As regards Italy, there were two separate instruments of different dates. On the 24th March, 1891, the delimitation arrangement, equally convenient to both parties, was signed, defining the respective spheres in East Africa. On the 15th of the following April the arrangement was succeeded by an independent one, defining the Italian sphere northward on the Red Sea. The prior agreement was complete in itself, and unconditional.

In the case of the recent Anglo-Congolese Agreement, the lease of a port on Lake Albert was balanced by the conditional lease, since abandoned, of a port on Lake Tanganyika.

It seems also to have escaped M. Hanotaux' recollection, when he spoke of the cession of Heligoland to Germany, that France also received her equivalent for her recognition of the British Protectorate over Zanzibar in the recognition by Great Britain of her Protectorate over Madagascar.

You were right in saying that the northern limit of the British sphere, left undefined in the Anglo-German Agreement, was defined in the IInd Article of the Anglo-Congolese Agreement.

In further discussions respecting the Waima incident, you should take care that it is clearly understood that the reason for the decision of Her Majesty's Government not to press for redress for the attack on the British force is the uncertainty as to the situation of the place where the encounter took place.

The terms of the Treaty between France and Liberia show that it was far removed from the French sphere; it was, therefore, either in the British sphere, or in that of Liberia, into which, by arrangement, French officers are, under special circumstances, permitted to follow fugitives.

The Anglo-Liberian frontier is, in this part, not delineated, and though Waima is in the immediate neighbourhood of territory unquestionably British, it cannot be said with any confidence that it lies within that territory. It is on this ground that Her Majesty's Government are prepared, under certain circumstances, to waive a claim which they would otherwise have felt it their duty to press.

I am, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 5.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received September 15.)

(No. 232. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 13, 1894.

M. HANOTAUX informed me yesterday that he had not yet thought it advisable to make any communication to the French Colonial Office in regard to the proposals made by Her Majesty's Government for the settlement of pending African questions until he could lay before M. Delcassé a comprehensive project of settlement, when he hoped he might be fortified by the support of the President of the Council and of M. Casimir-Perier.

The important point to be cleared up was what were the precise limits of the confines of Egypt referred to in Article II of the Anglo-German Convention. His Excellency was now studying that question, and would be in a position, not later than next week, to put before me his theories as to this, founding them on various documents and maps at his disposal. In answer to my inquiry, his Excellency said he did not understand the claims of Egypt to extend as far as the watershed of the Congo (Oubanghi), but was unable to give me that day a positive reply as to where he regarded the northern boundary of the French sphere to the west of the Bahr-el-Ghazal to be situated. Unless we could, before proceeding further, his Excellency continued, ascertain from reliable data where the confines of Egypt mentioned in the Anglo-German Convention were situated, we should risk intrenching on the Egyptian question.

M. Hanotaux, however, distinctly declared that he was prepared—when the extent of the sphere of British influence contemplated under the Anglo-German Convention was definitely laid down—to acknowledge it, presuming that Her Majesty's Government would offer sufficient compensation.

The conversation then turned on the adequacy of the offers made by Her Majesty's Government. M. Hanotaux said that he looked with an eye of envy at a Convention of such a comprehensive character as that concluded by Her Majesty's Government with Germany in 1890. There was the cession of Heligoland, which, as I had pointed out, was the compensation offered to Germany for the recognition of the British Protectorate over Zanzibar, just as "the free hand in Madagascar" was, according to our view, the compensation afforded to France for a similar recognition on her part. But there were the concessions to Germany in South-Western Africa, in Damaraland and Wallfisch Bay; her access to the Zambesi; in Togoland; in the continental portion of East Africa. What was Her Majesty's Government now offering to France which could be regarded as at all in proportion to such concessions? In vain I pointed out to his Excellency that a careful perusal of the Convention would make it clear to him that it had been drawn up on the "donnant donnant"—give and take principle. He went on to enlarge on the exploits and persistent labours of the French explorers, who, animated by the adventurous, though possibly unpractical, spirit inherent to the French nature, had effected explorations which had been unequalled by their foreign competitors since the days of Stanley and Livingstone. Were all these to be rendered nugatory? Was he to fly in the face of the Colonial party in France, and resign the greater part of what had been achieved? I had referred, his Excellency said, to the British explorers, to the persistent progress made by our Chartered Companies, who, he admitted, had been animated by the more practical spirit always evidenced by Englishmen, but could I expect him to set aside the efforts of such men as Crampel, Monteil, Maistre, Marchand, Dybowski, and even, his Excellency said, Mizon?

I said that a glance at the colouring of the Map of Africa hanging behind his Excellency's table proved that their efforts had not been wasted.

Though M. Hanotaux declared, doubtless with truth, that he had not had a discussion with M. Delcassé, he incidentally mentioned during the course of our conversation that he had recently seen M. Haussman, who I have little doubt had primed him in regard to what then passed as to our Borgu Concession.

In the first place, his Excellency said that our concession of the territory to the rear and to the north-east of Dahomey was not as complete as we believed. There was a German Treaty zone to the rear of Togoland which intrenched on the territory proposed to be resigned to the French sphere. That zone touched the point where the line on my map coming from the north through Borgu went due east. What France wished to achieve was a communication with the Niger on the right bank south of Say, though he was aware she was excluded from the left bank.

I said that his Excellency would be imposing upon me a hopeless task if he expected me to propose such a thing. The line it was proposed to concede was the extreme limit consistent with the security for revenue purposes of the position of the Niger Company on the river. I had myself privately gone fully into the matter with Sir G. Goldie. The line marked in red on the right bank of the river was actually under the administration of the Company, and after the Mizon episode it was vain to think of shaking its resolutions. M. Hanotaux merely said that he was bound to lay stress on that as one of the aspirations of the Colonial party to which they attached the greatest value. But he pressed the question in a very lukewarm manner, and appeared to me to be speaking "par acquit de conscience." In what he moreover said about the German rights over a portion of Borgu, he was probably following the prompting of M. Haussman, who had doubtless in view the article in the "Kreuz Zeitung" of the 27th August last.

When I expressed my fears lest the absence of any speedy settlement of the Borgu question should force Her Majesty's Government to continue the game which I had once described to M. Casimir-Perier of "à trompeur trompeur et demi," his Excellency asked whether we would not exhibit or give the dates of our Borgu Treaties, so as to ascertain whether they were antecedent to those of the French. But I anticipate that when the question as to the existence of any German rights over a portion of Borgu is cleared up M. Hanotaux will accept the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and recognize the British sphere south of the Say-Barruwa line.

His Excellency led me to believe that he will next week formulate the conditions on which he would be prepared to recognize the British sphere in the Nile Watershed.

I felt that it would be premature for the present to refer to the commercial questions touched upon in the last paragraph of your Lordship's despatch No. 300 A, Africa, but M. Hanotaux expressed his satisfaction at the prospect of my arriving at an understanding with Captain Binger as to the labour question on the Ivory Coast, and his Excellency's general tone throughout the conversation was moderate and conciliatory.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 6.

Minute by Sir P. Anderson.

I HAVE seen Sir G. Goldie, and told him that the Secretary of State was not prepared to take the responsibility of stopping the expedition on which Captain Lugard had been dispatched.

I said that I would not say more than this. He replied that he quite understood.

H. P. A.

Foreign Office, September 19, 1894.

K.—*Sept.* 20.

No. 7.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received September 23.)

(No. 247. Africa.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 22, 1894.

ON resuming to-day our discussion relative to African negotiations, M. Hanotaux said that he had yesterday passed the greater portion of the afternoon in explaining them to M. Delcassé, the Minister for the Colonies, and to M. Haussmann, whom he had seen even this morning. His Excellency would be glad to learn from me the point on which, as I had informed him privately, I could afford him an elucidation.

I replied, that he had pointed out that the British sphere on the Upper Nile Valley, for which we desired recognition on the part of France, was, in his opinion, not distinctly defined in the Anglo-German Convention of 1890.

That sphere was, I said, defined in the 2nd Article of the Anglo-Congolese Agreement of the 12th May. West of the Nile there was no mention in Article 3 of the Anglo-German Agreement of the confines of Egypt; and the western boundary of the sphere ended at the 10th parallel, which constituted its northern limit.

His Excellency replied that he for the first time heard this sphere authoritatively defined as emanating from the Anglo-German Convention, remarking that we apparently proposed to declare a portion of the possessions of Egypt as constituting a British sphere of influence, and thus entèr on the Egyptian question; for I would doubtless understand that he could not recognize the Anglo-Congolese Agreement.

I preferred, in view of your Lordship's despatch to Sir F. Plunkett No. 109 of the 28th ultimo, not to enter upon the merits of this latter portion of his Excellency's remark, merely observing that he had practically admitted its scope as far as the parallel of 5° 30′, whilst Her Majesty's Government were at present not a party to the Franco-Congolese Agreement. But, in regard to the former portion of the remark, I said that his Excellency's assertion appeared to me to be untenable, since Her Majesty's Government had distinctly declared that they regarded the rights of Egypt over the sphere as being merely in abeyance until Egypt was in a position to assert them, and, moreover, that, as far as I was aware, the rights of Egypt as established by Firmans only applied to the Provinces of Ouadai, Kordofan, Darfur, and another province.

M. Hanotaux replied that, as he had already stated to me, the French Government was prepared on certain conditions to make a comprehensive arrangement with Her Majesty's Government on certain African questions, in which should be comprised the recognition of the sphere of influence defined as I have described.

But if that sphere was not an arbitrary one conceived by Her Majesty's Government, it was one that emanated from the Anglo-German Convention of 1890, the effects of which had only been recognized by France as regarded our Protectorate over the islands of Zanzibar and Pemba.

In the case of Germany, by an arrangement of a subsequent date, France had acknowledged those arrangements, and consequently the possession by Germany of certain portions of the continental domains of the Sultan of Zanzibar. But in the case of Great Britain, no such recognition or sanction had been yet accorded by France, and had still to be insured. As negotiator, his Excellency continued, he was to a certain extent a go-between. In France the Colonial party had certain ambitions and aspirations which must be taken into account. In the same manner in England, similar extreme views must be considered. It was useless for him, with all the goodwill which he genuinely entertained, to attempt to make an arrangement which he would have to defend in the Chamber unless he could silence all the objections which would, he knew beforehand, be preferred.

I said I could only undertake to submit his Excellency's views for the consideration of Her Majesty's Government. They were theories on which a statesman and not a diplomatist could pronounce an opinion, and they entered into the domain of Imperial policy.

But I urged his Excellency, now that I had laid before him the proposals of Her Majesty's Government, to submit his own.

M. Hanotaux said that the more comprehensive any arrangement with Her Majesty's Government might be, the more would he be strengthened in the endeavours which he genuinely intended to exercise in imposing it on the Colonial Office and on the Colonial party in France.

With the Anglo-German Convention before him, he proceeded to point out various Articles applying to transit dues, freedom of trade, freedom of navigation, monopolies, trading concessions, protection of missionaries, religious toleration, &c., many of which might find a place in an Anglo-French Agreement.

On the other hand, the commercial concessions in the rear of Sierra Leone (his undertaking with regard to which he was prepared to maintain), and other commercial concessions in conformity with British doctrines which he would be prepared to offer, would, he felt confident, meet the views of the commercial bodies in England. He had for the first time distinctly brought these commercial questions before M. Delcassé, and his proposals had been favourably accepted. Only as to the Porto Novo arrangement would any difficulties be experienced. My despatch to your Excellency No. 240, Africa, of the 19th instant, indicates in what these consist.

I then referred to the question of the Borgu arrangement, on which I had a few days ago addressed a private communication to his Excellency, of which I inclose a copy.

M. Hanotaux said that he had communicated my letter to M. Delcassé, with whom he had discussed the whole question, and that he regarded the prospect of a settlement as most favourable; but as to my request, that he would lay before me his own complete proposal, he thought I would perceive that it would be as yet premature for him to do so, and that he must beg me to communicate to your Lordship what had passed in our interview of to-day. Now that France had become the immediate neighbour of the sphere of British influence which we claimed, Her Majesty's Government, as well as public opinion in England, would, he felt confident, see the importance of insuring the recognition on the part of France of an agreement which had been inherited from a previous British Cabinet.

M. Hanotaux' further arguments tended to convey his opinion—or, possibly, rather that of M. Delcassé—that, in the proposals which I had hitherto submitted to him, Her Majesty's Government were claiming from France the abandonment of all the results of the explorations of Brazza (which he specially instanced) to the south-east of the British Protectorate of the Niger, without offering adequate compensation in other directions for what we desired to insure.

I pointed out to his Excellency, in reply, that, in my opinion, a misconception had always prevailed in the French Colonial Office as to the extent of the British Protectorate of the Niger districts, as illustrated by the later Proclamation, dated the 18th October, 1887, which I exhibited to his Excellency, and which I maintained invalidated many of the claims preferred by French explorers, and his Excellency took note of the Proclamation in question, begging me, should it not be in the archives of his office, to give him a copy of it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

Inclosure in No. 7.

Mr. Phipps to M. Hanotaux.

Mon cher Ministre, *Paris, le* 17 *Septembre*, 1894.

AVANT de vous voir je désirais vous écrire quelques mots à propos de Borgu, une question qu'il me semble que nous pourrions traiter dans son rapport avec la ligne de Say et Barruwa.

L'hiver dernier, vous m'avez demandé, "Qu'est-ce que vous nous donnerez en échange de notre reconnaissance de votre sphére d'influence sur le Niger."

J'ai dû vous répondre que je n'avais rien à donner, car nous trouvions que la reconnaisance de la ligne de Say et Barruwa—tracée selon les conditions du Traité—ressortait clairement de ses stipulations; de même que la "ligne fermante" au sud-est était indiqué par les faits accomplis.

Mais maintenant je suis en mesure, comme vous le savez, de vous proposer une solution complète de la Convention de 1890.

Nous avons des Traités avec le Borgu, non seulement avec les Chefs dans le Borgu mais avec le Sultan même, dont je pourrais vous indiquer les dates. Nous avons aussi des Traités dans le Mossi, où vous en avez également. Si vous acceptez notre arrangement nous les abandonnerions.

Il est vrai que les Allemands réclament un territoire derrière le Dahomey, auquel ils donnent le nom de "Tschautsland."

Est-ce qu'il existe vraiment? J'en doute; en tout cas l'Allemagne n'en a jamais donné une définition, et elle ne pourrait pas vous disputer le "Hinterland" de votre nouvelle Colonie en vous présentant—comme le leur—un territoire non occupé.

Si vous refusez notre abandon d'une grande partie du Borgu (avec le Sultan duquel nous avons des Traités authentiques), nous aurons de nouveau le chaos et vous aurez à vous débrouiller avec les Allemands.

N'est-il pas temps, avec le but de réaliser tout ce que vous m'avez dit le 10 Août, d'en finir avec cette "course au clocher" Africaine?

Si nous tombions d'accord nous pourrions introduire, afin d'arrêter tout nouveau Traité de part et d'autre, une stipulation dans le genre de l'Article VII de la Convention Anglo-Allemande de 1890.

Je nourris l'espoir que Mercredi prochain nous serons à même de faire quelques pas sur le chemin de la solution générale, et que de votre côté vous pourriez me présenter vos idées,

Croyez-moi, mon cher Ministre, avec mes cordialités dévouées, votre, &c.

(Signé) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 8.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received September 28.)

(No. 250. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 26, 1894.

THE return of Baron de Mohrenheim to Paris having resulted in one of his Excellency's customary prolonged visits, the Minister for Foreign Affairs was unable, at the diplomatic reception to-day, to continue the African negotiations, and requested me to call on him on Saturday morning. The new feature involved by M. Ribot's note of the 8th December, 1890 (of which I had reminded his Excellency, and which he admitted had escaped him), could in the interval be examined, and M. Hanotaux trusted that some progress might be made in negotiations which he was most anxious to conclude before the meeting of the Chambers.

His Excellency then referred to a private communication I had made to him, to the effect that a recent so-called "Communiqué," relative to Madagascar, in the English press, was not officially inspired, inquiring whether I meant to disavow it. I said that, as far as I remembered its tenour, it had appeared to me harmless, but that I merely desired to establish the fact that it was in no way due to official inspiration. M. Hanotaux, after observing that he was gratified to learn that since the position assumed by France in the question was "tellement nette," added that he had also just seen, on his return to Paris, the absurd rumours relative to an alleged expedition by Colonel Colvile to the Nile Valley. I said that I thought such a rumour did not, considering the quarter whence it emanated, need serious denial on my part, and that I had been pleased to notice the sensible view taken of it (with a sole exception) by the Paris press. I had, however, also observed that his Excellency was similarly credited with contemplating an expedition to Tuat.

M. Hanotaux replied that he had never thought it worth while to refute the ridiculous rumours propagated so persistently by the Italian press as to French designs in the "Tripolitaine," or as to a Tuat expedition. As to the latter some convoys had been interfered with, and it had been necessary to send a restricted number of soldiers to restore order. I might be confident, his Excellency continued, that no "surprises" were to be anticipated on his part, and if over-zealous Agents in any quarter were to attempt anything of the sort, he undertook that they would be called to order. He added with some earnestness that he trusted that on neither side would a "politique à surprises" be followed, especially in the regions with regard to which actual negotiations were in progress.

I said that I was sufficiently acquainted with the views of Her Majesty's Government to be able to state confidently that they entirely were in accordance with those which I was glad to hear expressed by his Excellency.

M. Hanotaux said, I thought apologetically, that both M. Nisard and M. Benoit had not yet returned from leave, and that he consequently had hitherto little aid to rely on in the negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 9.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 255. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 29, 1894.

ALMOST at the outset of our conversation this morning, M. Hanotau admitted that M. Ribot's note of the 8th December, 1890, in which his predecessor had acknowledged the British assumption of the continental possessions of the Sultan of Zanzibar, had escaped his attention. He had had but little assistance available in his Department, both M. Nisard and the Director of the African Department, M. Benoit, having, when he had spoken to me, been absent. The recognition thus afforded would probably some day have to be made public, and the responsibility would fall on M. Ribot.

In one respect, however, his Excellency sought to argue, the position he had assumed was confirmed. That recognition had only affected certain defined portions of East Africa, and did not extend to the sphere for which we now wished to insure the recognition of France.

In answer to my inquiry as to where his Excellency sought for the "compensations" which should insure the recognition by France of that sphere, his reply was to the effect that he sought for them in those regions, either by "partition," by a Self-denying Agreement, or by some formula which should secure equal rights to France.

I asked him whether, in using the word "partition" (which I fancy escaped from him), his Excellency meant to imply a partition of territory belonging to Egypt, for he was aware that in proposing to assume the control of the territory referred to, we intended to respect Egyptian rights, which we regarded as merely in abeyance. Our reason for exercising control over that territory emanated from our possession of Uganda, the necessity of securing its northern frontier, and of rescuing that territory from anarchy, in default of its administration by Egypt, its natural possessor.

M. Hanotaux said there were portions of the sphere as defined in the Anglo-Congolese Convention (the validity of which Convention he distinctly declined to recognize) over which the rights of Egypt did not extend. In any case, however, the proposed British sphere of influence in the Nile Valley was not defined in the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, inasmuch as Article III did not establish its northern limits. I had declared authoritatively that its northern boundary was the 10th parallel, whilst its western boundary was, according to Article III, the Nile Watershed, but in doing so I had not followed the terms of the Anglo-German Convention.

I requested his Excellency to state to me precisely the theory he held, in order to submit it to Her Majesty's Government. I give the exact words which he employed:—

"Que la Convention Anglo-Allemande de 1890 s'appliquait au Haut-Nil, c'est-à-dire à tout ce qui se trouvait en relation avec l'Afrique Orientale. Que par conséquent, ce qui appartient à l'Égypte est en dehors, et que pour reconnaître la sphère Anglaise il faut constater ce qui est l'Égypte—jusqu'où vont ses confins."

His Excellency said he was quite ready to enter into an examination, founded on geographical data, as to where was the southernmost limit of Egypt proper.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 10.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received October* 1.)

(No. 256. Africa.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 29, 1894.

M. HANOTAUX commenced his discussion on the African negotiations this morning by explaining to me the pretensions put forward by the French Colonial Office, especially as regards the Niger districts. In doing so, he admitted that they were "pretensions," and that he was not prepared to indorse them to their full extent; but in order to arrive at a complete solution of the pending difficulties, they must, he said, be refuted by the production and exhibition of Treaties and documents. If such a course were not followed, he would be attempting to arrive at a settlement with Her Majesty's Government which, under the influence of the Colonial party, would be rejected by the Chambers.

Placing before us the map forwarded to me in your Lordship's despatch No. 268 of the 24th July, M. Hanotaux stated that, in the opinion of the French Colonial Office, a solution of the pending African difficulties was retarded by the absence of elucidation of the following points:—

1. What was the meaning of the red line on that map drawn from the north of Soulina to the mouth of the Cavally River? It did not take into account our proposals as regarded the line to the west of the Niger, nor the slip of territory to the east of the Cavally River (within the red line), which belonged now to France by her arrangement with Liberia.

I replied that the map in question had been transmitted to me for my personal assistance, and to facilitate the negotiations. The proposals of Her Majesty's Government as to the line to the west of the Niger were absolute (presuming a general settlement were attained), and I had no reason to believe that, in such case, we proposed to interfere with the Franco-Liberian arrangement. His Excellency could, therefore, set aside that red line as possessing, for the purposes of the negotiation, any value.

2. How far did Her Majesty's Government regard the "Hinterland" behind Ashanti to extend north of where Gottogo is placed on the map, and to the west of the Anglo-German neutral zone?

I said that Mr. Fergusson had made Treaties to the rear of the Gold Coast Colony and Ashanti, and even to the north of the neutral zone as far as Mossi, with which we also had Treaties. But that I had no reason to believe that, in the case of a general settlement, we would refuse to resign any which might extend much to the north of the 10th parallel. I had, however, in consequence of M. Haussmann's observations, asked for information from your Lordship as to this point.

3. The proposed line marked on the map to the rear of Dahomey did not, since the acquisition of that territory after a successful campaign, satisfy the French Colonial Office. Gomba, on the Niger, was the extreme point to which, according to French information, the administration of the Niger Company extended, and the Convention of 1890 had not affected territory situated to the west of the Niger. The Colonial Office asked for a line traced obliquely in a south-west direction from Gomba to the north-eastern corner of the red line, just north of Niki, leaving the whole territory west of the Niger, and situated to the north-west of that proposed line, to France.

I replied that such a notion was preposterous. It involved the abandonment of the Treaties long ago concluded by the Niger Company with Gourma (which Empire extended far to the east), as well as those with Borgu, of which I had given his Excellency the dates. That of the year 1890 was concluded with Borgu or Boussa at Boussa, and there was an antecedent one dated 1885.

M. Hanotaux said that the Colonial Office denied the validity of the last-mentioned one, and maintained that any Treaty concluded at Boussa with a so-termed Sultan would possess no value, as the Sultan of Borgu's seat of Government was at Niki. The only course to enable him to refute the theories of the Colonial Office would be, M. Hanotaux said, for us to produce our Treaties.

4. The French Colonial Office admit that the Empire of Sokoto extends to the north of any straight line drawn from Say to Barruwa, and that, therefore, any Sokoto possessions situated to the north of such straight line belonged, subject to examination by the Commission, to the Niger Company, according to the 1890 Agreement. But

there were territories to the south of such straight line which did not belong to Sokoto, namely, Bornu, and a territory comprised in a triangle drawn from Argnugu to Say, from Say along the Niger to Gomba, and thence along the Sokoto to Argnugu.

I replied that we were reverting to the irritating discussions of last winter, and again explained that the line was to be drawn so as to secure to the Niger Company "all that fairly belongs to the King of Sokoto," but not so as to exclude from its sphere all territory which did not belong to that Empire. In proof I read to his Excellency the very words used by the Marquis of Salisbury in conveying to Lord Lytton on the 21st July, 1890, M. Waddington's proposal, as well as those employed by his Lordship on the 24th July, establishing that the "*southern boundary of French influence* behind Algeria should be traced from Say to Lake Tchad," Barruwa being established by the actual Agreement as the final point. If the matter were to be submitted to arbitration it would be impossible, I said, to affix any other interpretation to these plain words than that which I had put forward.

M. Hanotaux said that the Say-Barruwa line, in the view of the French Colonial Office, whilst preventing any French penetration from the north, had not assigned the whole African territory to the south-east of Lake Tchad to Great Britain. For example, the Colonial Office maintained that there was no British Treaty with Adamoua, and that at the present moment a French detachment was still established at Yola with the Sultan, of which Great Britain had no Treaty.

I smiled, and said that I was certainly unaware that a French detachment was established within the British Protectorate, but that I would inform your Lordship. We had, besides, I added, a formal Treaty with Yola, and on looking at the map his Excellency would observe what was the position of Adamoua, a portion of which was within the British sphere. Moreover, I had hoped that the notifications in the "London Gazette," which I had shown to his Excellency, and which were dated 1885 and 1887, would have served to dispel the illusions under which the Colonial Office had laboured as to the extent of our sphere.

I felt that my own illusions as to the possibility of arriving at a general African arrangement were rapidly disappearing when I heard such theories put forward. As to the claims preferred by the Colonial Office in consequence of the Dahomey campaign, I reminded M. Hanotaux what a vast difference there was between the claims we had advanced when his Excellency had met me as a member of the Niger Commission, and what we now offered. We had then demanded that a line from Say (Lord Salisbury had even insisted that the line should skirt the Niger a certain distance north of Say) should run westwards as far as the meridian 0° of Greenwich, and following that meridian a certain distance should reach ultimately Bondoukou in an oblique line westwards. We now were proposing to resign a great part of Gurma and Borgu, which latter we regarded as within the British Protectorate. M. Hanotaux sought to deny that we had ever claimed to touch the meridian 0°, but I said that his memory was at fault. As to the question of Adamoua, &c., my instructions were to the effect that all discussions as to M. Mizon's action should be dropped on both sides.

M. Hanotaux said that he could not regard the original proposals of settlement which I had made as final ones, and as excluding all discussion, otherwise there would be no negotiation, but rather an ultimatum, if he could use the term. He was bound to put forward the views entertained by the French Colonial Office. They might be extreme views, and he regarded himself, with the desire which he entertained to arrive at a settlement, as playing the part of an arbiter between those views and the proposals which I had made. I said that, from my point of view, a cobweb appeared to pervade the minds of the Colonial Office as to these matters, which all our efforts failed to disperse. In our negotiations we had hitherto avoided written communications or "paperasses," but I could now see no other alternative than a statement of our views on paper. As to the production of Treaties, I did not know if Her Majesty's Government would consent to such a course.

M. Hanotaux said he would be only too glad, in view of his desire to arrive at a settlement, to be placed in a position to satisfy the objections of the French Colonial Office.

I will treat of the portion of my conversation affecting the Nile Valley in a separate despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 11.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 1.)

(No. 257. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, September* 30, 1894.

IN reporting the arguments which were exchanged between the French Minister of Foreign Affairs and myself, I feel that I have been but repeating much of what passed during my discussion with his Excellency last winter in his capacity as Commissioner under the Agreement of 1890.

I more than once reminded his Excellency this morning of the assurances which he had made to me on the 5th August (reported in my despatch No. 198) in regard to his desire to arrange pending African questions, and how little the pretensions which he put forward on behalf of the Colonial Office were in accordance with them.

His Excellency assured me that he could only regard himself in these matters as a go-between, and that if I were placed in a position to produce Treaties, and to enable him to refute, by documents, the extreme views of the Colonial Office, he would be only too glad to play the part of Arbitrator in regard to them.

My instructions, however, as contained in Lord Rosebery's despatch No. 179 of the 26th August, 1893, prohibit my entering into any discussion as to the validity of Treaties within the British sphere, neither party to the Agreement of 1890 having any concern with Treaties concluded by the other within its own sphere.

Assuming, however, that M. Hanotaux' good will is genuine, and he makes repeated asseverations of its being so, he appears to be unable to exercise it without affording proofs to his colleague at the Colonial Office that the claims preferred by the various explorers are not based on facts.

M. Benoit, who returned to Paris two or three days ago, and who is in constant communication with the Colonial Office, has evidently been priming M. Hanotaux on the Niger questions, and I have always found that official animated by extreme colonial views, especially in regard to those.

Unless I am authorized to cite or produce Treaties and thus refute the colonial theories I fear the negotiations will prove abortive, especially as regards one of the most important points, viz., the Niger Territories.

Meanwhile, in view of the distinct attitude of the Colonial Office, I entirely withdraw any observation I may have ventured to make as to Captain Lugard's expedition being premature. I would also represent that any information which the Niger Company may have obtained through their expedition to Bornu would be most useful to me.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 12.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 2.)

(No. 48.)

(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, October* 2, 1894.

I FOUND the Minister of Foreign Affairs to-day far more resolute to resist the pretensions put forward by the Colonial party. His Excellency is possibly influenced by rumours from London, but also by my private communications with him since Saturday.

If Her Majesty's Government will allow the line to the east of Dahomey to be prolonged due north as far as Kombu on the 12th parallel, his Excellency undertakes to exercise strong pressure on the Colonial Office:—

Firstly, to recognize, in the terms of the Convention of 1890, the line from Say to Barruwa, Bornu remaining in the British sphere of influence;

Secondly, to recognize as the eastern frontier of the British sphere the lines indicated in the Agreements between Great Britain and Germany of 1886 and 1893, the Franco-German Agreement of 1894 being recognized by Her Majesty's Government;

Thirdly, to insure any French post alleged to be left in British territory being at once removed.

The position of M. Hanotaux would be greatly facilitated if Her Majesty's Government would recognize as our boundary to the rear of Ashanti, if not the mountain chain, at least the 9th parallel.

My next meeting with his Excellency is put off till Saturday, when I am to meet the Minister of the Colonies, or an official of that Department.

His Excellency said that all causes of dispute in the Niger districts would be removed if Her Majesty's Government consent to the above-mentioned concession in Borgu.

(Secret.)

His Excellency assured me that in order to attain this the consent of certain members of the Colonial party would have to be secured by the offer of certain tangible advantages.

I felt it my duty to speak in serious language to his Excellency, and to point at the possibility of the Mizon correspondence having to be published, and at negotiations being broken off.

No. 13.

The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. Phipps.

(No. 57. Africa.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October 4, 1894.*

IF Her Majesty's Government were to conclude an arrangement as regards the Niger on the basis indicated in your telegram No. 48, what are they to understand would be the situation as regards the recognition of their sphere in the Nile Basin?

No. 14.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 260. Africa. Most Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 4, 1894.*

AFTER a few remarks relative to Baron de Courcel's appointment and its acceptance by Her Majesty the Queen, I told M. Hanotaux that reflection had only served to enhance the disheartening effect produced upon me by his presentation to me last Saturday of the extreme pretensions put forward by the French Colonial party. I expressed my hope that the private communication which I had since made to him had not proved ineffectual.

His Excellency said that he trusted that I would not look at the question from too tragic a point of view. Though he had been forced to put before me the extreme views of the Colonial Minister, he had at the same time assured me of his determination to resist them to the best of his power. When I referred to the alleged presence of a French detachment in British territory, his Excellency said he preferred to substitute that expression by the word "poste," as having a less military sound. I said that I feared the difference was insensible. At any rate, I continued, Her Majesty's Government in offering to make the concessions as regards Borgu believed they were making very substantial ones, and I believed that in impressing the grounds of the French claims I could not have done so more forcibly, even if I had held a brief from the French Government. I had, however, done so with the desire to conciliate conflicting ideas. The counter-proposals of the Colonial Office, however, must result in complete chaos, and in the rupture of negotiations again, the Colonial Office's theories as to the effects of the Anglo-French Agreement of 1890 could, I felt, only result in the publication of the correspondence which preceded it, and in that relating to Lieutenant Mizon. This would lay the French Government open to an imputation of bad faith.

M. Hanotaux was somewhat nettled at the expression, and said that he could not be laid open to such a charge. I said that a quotation I would show to his Excellency of words used by M. Ribot in 1890, would prove that if the Colonial Office sought to argue that the arrangement was unilateral the expression "bad faith" might be employed by public opinion.

Lord Lytton had on the 26th June, 1890, stated as follows:—

"M. Ribot authorizes me to tell your Lordship most confidentially that France will not oppose the establishment of a British Protectorate at Zanzibar, provided that

England will enter into independent negotiations with her for the *delimitation of their respective spheres of influence* in West African territories east of Senegal and north of the Niger to Lake Tchad."

These words forbad any unilateral delimitation.

His Excellency urged that Lord Lytton, speaking of a question then so little known, might easily have lacked precision; but I said that it was impossible to impute such an inaccuracy to so experienced a diplomatist when making an important formal communication. M. Hanotaux finally requested me to give him the words in writing, which I agreed to do.

His Excellency then said that I could have little idea how far the pretensions of the Colonial party went. He had not trusted himself to read to me the Memorandum which had been before him when I saw him last Saturday. Even the proposals he had made to me were modified ones. I replied, that if I could venture to make such a comparison, his Excellency was in the position of the dexterous driver of a coach, who, however, at the same time suffered the application of a heavy drag-chain which impeded all progress.

Opening the map, M. Hanotaux then said that he had made use of my letter, and that if Her Majesty's Government would consent to the line drawn from the coast east of Dahomey to be prolonged due northwards to Komba on the Niger, the line thence to follow the Niger (western bank) as far as Say, he would engage to try to force this solution on the Colonial Office. It would be accompanied by a complete settlement of the Niger question.

I said that this proposal would deprive us of the greater portion of Borgu and Gurma. His Excellency said that the Colonial Office claimed to have a Treaty with Niki, and had asked for a line to be drawn south of that place to the fourth parallel near Busah.

If we decided on mutual production of Treaties, we should be putting off a solution for the two or three months which would be taken up in their verification. As it was, his Excellency's proposal could not be regarded as absolute, but he undertook to enforce it with all the authority he could command, adding that he could confidentially tell me that he would have to purchase the consent of certain prominent members of the Colonial party by "de gros avantages" or appointments. Only that day the proof sheets of a violent personal attack on himself had been brought to him, and he had begged that such attacks should at least be put off till after the negotiations, and not made during their progress.

I then established what would be the remaining Niger Territory settlement contemplated; it must (presuming the proposal were entertained), I said, consist in the recognition of the line from, say to Barruwa traced in accordance with the Agreement, the comprehension of Bornu in the British sphere, and recognition of the Anglo-German Agreements.

His Excellency presumed that I did not mean the line as traced on the map, which comprehended in our sphere territories marked as "Independent Pagan tribes." I said that it would be decided by the Commission, but his Excellency distinctly admitted that the "two extremities" of Say and Barruwa should be maintained, thus giving us Bornu and not depriving us of the "triangle" near Say, to which he had previously referred. The conditional Agreement then took the form which I embodied in my telegram to your Lordship of this evening.

M. Hanotaux concluded by saying that if Her Majesty's Government would agree to his proposal, and he succeeded in enforcing it, all possibility of dispute in the Niger regions would be entirely removed; and engaged that I should meet M. Haussmann with him on Saturday morning, or even, if I preferred it, M. Delcassé.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 15.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 261. Africa.)
My Lord, *Paris, October 4, 1894.*

WITH reference to my preceding despatch, M. Hanotaux spoke to me relative to the question of the Ashanti "Hinterland," and I indicated roughly the territory over which our Treaties extended. His Excellency said he had hoped we would have accepted in a general arrangement the mountain ridge to the north of Gottogo as our frontier.

The Colonial Office had pointed out that if we sought to close in the neutral zone (which he was prepared to recognize) as regards its northern boundary, we should interfere with all French trade with that zone. It would much facilitate his difficult position if Her Majesty's Government would come to some arrangement on this point.

In error I mentioned, as to this point, in my telegram No. 48, the "9th parallel;" I should have put the "10th parallel," at which the northern frontier of the neutral zone is traced.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 16.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 5.)

(No. 49. Africa.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
Paris, October 5, 1894.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram No. 57 of the 4th instant, relative to the African negotiations, I told M. Hanotaux to-day that, although your Lordship had given me no reply in regard to his last proposals, you had reminded me that any arrangement to be concluded must be comprehensive in character.

The following is the impression which I derived from our prolonged conversation on the Nile Valley question, which consequently came under discussion.

France would be prepared, by an Agreement or by an exchange of notes, to engage not to advance beyond the Congo watershed, provided Her Majesty's Government would engage not to advance beyond the posts actually occupied by Great Britain into the sphere under discussion (over which we declare the rights of Egypt to be only in abeyance) without previous negotiation with France.

His Excellency would, however, be prepared to take into consideration, within these broad lines, any proposal that your Lordship might make, or any modifications of the ideas I have embodied above.

An understanding having been arrived at on other African questions, our negotiations on them would be pursued on such basis.

What I have mentioned above appears to afford an explanation of what M. Hanotaux termed a "Self-denying Agreement."

He argues that the Belgian advance into the Nile Valley alone created a pressure for the solution of Nile Valley question, which, until that advance took place, was dormant. Such pressure was no longer existent.

I will report fully in a despatch by messenger.

No. 17.

The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. Phipps.

(No. 58. Africa.)
(Telegraphic.) P.
Foreign Office, October 5, 1894.

A FRONTIER would be accepted by the Niger Company formed by a prolongation of the line which is the eastern boundary of Dahomey to the western bank of the Niger, which it would reach near the 12th parallel. The acceptance would be subject to the condition of the French Government recognizing as within the British sphere all territory to the south of a straight line drawn between Barrawa and Say, as also all territory to the north of that line which may be proved to belong to Sokoto. A further condition will be the recognition by France of the Agreements of 1886 and 1893 between Great Britain and Germany, the Agreement between France and Germany of 1894 being recognized by Great Britain. It will also be required that the question of the Mizon difficulty shall be considered as terminated. Any French post which may be found to be established at Yola would have to be withdrawn.

In the Hinterland of Ashantee, Great Britain has Treaties to the south of Mossi, and it is said that the territory between the 11th and 10th parallels comprises trade routes which are of value. M. Hanotaux has already promised to recognize the neutral zone, and such recognition would have to form part of any arrangement. Considering that an immense interior sphere would accrue to France, to ask Great Britain to abandon the small portion north of the zone which she claims seems to have no justification.

Subject to these modifications, M. Hanotaux' proposals seem to be such as might be accepted should a satisfactory settlement on the other African questions be arrived at.

It is most desirable, in order to satisfy public opinion here as to territorial arrangements, that the Agreement should include commercial and Kroo labour concessions.

No. 18.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 6.)

(No. 263. Africa. Very Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, October* 5, 1894.

I TOLD M. Hanotaux this afternoon that I had received no reply from your Lordship relative to the proposals, or rather the undertaking, he had made to me on Wednesday, but that I had been reminded that the solution of the African questions contemplated was to be a comprehensive one.

I said I would consequently ask his Excellency to explain to me an expression he had used when referring to the Nile Valley question, viz., "a Self-denying Agreement."

M. Hanotaux replied that he, candidly speaking, could not see why any such pressing necessity existed for at once settling finally the Nile Valley question. Why had the necessity, in the eyes of Her Majesty's Government, existed for making the Anglo-Congolese Agreement? Owing to the advance of the Belgians to the east of the Nile—and, I broke in, owing to our position in Uganda.

That pressing necessity, his Excellency continued, no longer existed. The advance of the Belgians had been arrested. Her Majesty's Government, as his Excellency understood, admitted that the rights of Egypt over the territory under discussion were only in suspense; why continue at this moment a heated discussion involving a definition of the limits of Egypt? A few months before he had conducted the negotiations with the Congolese at Brussels, the Congo Government had, as his Excellency could distinctly prove to me, offered to France, through Count de Grelle, the whole sphere under discussion, with the identically same limits to the north of Fashoda and the 10th parallel. The argument which had impressed itself on his Excellency's mind at the time had been, "How can France at some future time ask Great Britain to retire from Egypt proper if she accepts, under such circumstances, territory belonging to Egypt?"

I said, laughingly, that in his speech his Excellency had accounted for this act of self-denial by the respect felt for the integrity of the Ottoman dominions, as guaranteed by the Treaty of 1856, but that I must remind him that the Equatorial Provinces of Egypt were only subsequently acquired. His Excellency replied that later Treaties had guaranteed the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, but I thought it unnecessary to pursue this controversy, and his Excellency continued that he had not wished in such a manner to attempt to raise the Egyptian question. As regarded the question here at issue, he thought it could for the moment be left at rest by a mutual "déclaration de désintéressement."

I said I was entering into this discussion quite academically, and without instructions, but I could not conceive any such arrangement possible unless his Excellency would undertake that France would not advance beyond the watershed of the Congo. After hesitating a moment, M. Hanotaux said that such an undertaking might possibly be given if on our side we engaged not to extend our occupation beyond its existing actual limits. But what, I asked, was to become of the interests of civilization and of those of our position in East Africa under the hypothesis of a Mahdiist advance, or of that position being threatened? The territory in question could not be regarded as *terra nullius*. His Excellency said that under the hypothesis I had evoked the matter would then become one for negotiation with the French Government; however, on these broad lines, he would be willing to consider any proposal or any modification which might be suggested.

M. Hanotaux' proposal, I confess, took me somewhat by surprise, and I not unnaturally felt a certain embarrassment in discussing it. But I conceive it possible from the general tenour of his language and the disposition which he evidenced, that he might be disposed to enter into an arrangement which would restrict the French sphere of influence in those regions to the Congo watershed, both Powers engaging to respect Egyptian possessions. If I am qualified to judge, I should be inclined to think that his ideas only took shape in consequence of the explanation for which I had asked him at the opening of our conversation.

His Excellency said it would be understood that if any prospect of an arrangement as to this part of the question resulted from our conversation the other African negotiations would be continued from the point we had reached the day before yesterday.

I must apologize for this despatch being hurriedly written at the moment of the messenger's departure.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 18.*

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 8.)

(No. 51. Africa.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Paris, October* 8, 1894.

ARE Her Majesty's Government able to prove they have a Treaty with Nikki, which is in Borgu? An immediate answer would be acceptable.

No. 19.

The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. Phipps.

(No. 59. Africa.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 8, 1894.

THE answer to the question contained in your telegram No. 51 of to-day is undoubtedly in the affirmative. The Sultan of Borgu owns two residences: Nikki, in the interior, and Boussa, on the Niger.

(Confidential.)

Captain Lugard is probably now at the former place.

No. 20.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 10.)

(No. 266. Africa. Confidential.)
My Lord, *Paris, October* 9, 1894.

I CALLED on M. Hanotaux by appointment at half-past 10 this morning in order to meet M. Haussmann, of the Colonial Office, and our discussions upon African questions, which were continued during the afternoon, lasted over three hours.

In order to make clear to your Lordship the subjects which the discussions embraced, I have the honour to inclose a statement of their bases which I had drawn up beforehand. They were founded on your Lordship's despatch No. 300 A of the 14th August to the Marquis of Dufferin, with some slight modifications to meet French susceptibilities, together with other more important ones founded upon the *pourparlers* which have taken place since that despatch was received.

1. *Uganda.*

After his Excellency had raised objections to the terms I had employed, especially to the first sentence, he ultimately withdrew them.

2. *Sierra Leone.*

After some demur as to the paragraph relating to Kalieri, this was also accepted, M. Hanotaux and myself fully understanding those details of the Agreement not specified under this heading. His Excellency observed that there would have to be some alterations as regarded the portion of the boundary-line running through the Samu country. As to this I replied that I understood Colonel Cardew and Governor Ballay to be in accord.

3. *Collisions at Waima and N'Compan.*

M. Hanotaux suggested that this wording need not be embodied in any eventual Agreement, but that the understanding could be recorded in an exchange of notes.

I said that some official record of the solution, which could, if necessary, be published, must be made to satisfy Parliament.

Some considerable discussion took place to which I need not refer.

4. *Delimitation west of the Niger.*

Over this a prolonged discussion took place, M. Haussmann again pressing on behalf of M. Delcassé for a line to be drawn from the meridian 2° 46′ 55″ to Gomba, a proposal which I absolutely declined to convey to Her Majesty's Government. M. Hanotaux ultimately said that the three principal towns of Borgu were Niki, Gomba, and Busah. If we had the two latter Niki should fall to France, and he must ask for a loop, as in the cases of Yola and Bifara, to embrace that one of the three capitals in the French sphere. Upon my pressing his Excellency, neither he nor M. Haussmann could declare positively that they had a Treaty with Niki, whilst I maintained that our Treaty with Borgu would comprehend Niki. After showing considerable reluctance they passed the paragraph, maintaining, however, their pressure to obtain Niki. M. Hanotaux ultimately said that *if* we could produce a Treaty with Niki which would enable him to defend his desistance from this demand it might possibly be withdrawn.

5. *Interpretation of the Anglo-French Convention of* 1890.

This paragraph, taken in connection with the succeeding one, created a heated discussion. M. Haussmann produced M. Monteil's Report which declared that Mauri Adar, Guber, Maradi, and Tasawa (or Tessara), were not portions of Sokoto, the second and third provinces mentioned being constantly at war with that Emperor.

He produced Kiepert's Map, which also places those districts north of the line. He also claimed "the triangle" (referred to in a previous despatch), in which, however, he was not supported by M. Hanotaux. They were both, however, brought to admit that where a loop of the Sokoto River goes north of the line the Empire must overlap the straight line, and they undertook to supply me with extracts from Monteil's Report, declaring that they only wished for what was fair. His Excellency remarked that a great progress had been made since last winter, when the Colonial Office would not listen to the notion of resigning Bornu. Curiously enough, his Excellency himself suggested the words in red ink* to prevent either of the three riparian Powers crossing Lake Tchad on political grounds, whereas last winter he had claimed access to Bornu across the lake. I suggested the words underlined as not abandoning our contention and not making the solution in conflict with the Agreement of 1890.

6. *Mizon Question.*

This solution, M. Hanotaux declared, would expose him to the most violent attacks which, however, he was ready to encounter. I said that the quotations I had sent his Excellency from M. Waddington's note would, I thought, be useful to him when such controversy arose. I elicited that the statement as to the existence of a French post at Yola was based on M. Mizon's assertion, which I said was poor evidence on which to found so startling an announcement.

M. Hanotaux spoke of the loss of the French Company's cargo, and the sore feeling created. I said the "Sergent Malamine" and cargo had been duly condemned by a constituted Court at Akassa, whose decision could not be vitiated. M. Hanotaux ultimately urged that the honour of the flag was at issue, and that it would be a graceful act on the part of Her Majesty's Government, in view of the peculiar feelings of his countrymen on such points, to relieve him from a false position. His Excellency suggested, after discussion, the following addition :—

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* Italics in print.

"En considération des sentiments mutuels manifestés dans le présent arrangement le Gouvernement Anglais mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement Français le 'Sergent Malamine.'"

I said I would submit it to your Lordship, but expressed my fears lest the vessel might be already sold.

7. *Commercial Question.*

After trying several "rédactions," M. Hanotaux suggested the one inserted in red ink* in place of my own.

I explained, as stated at the end of your Lordship's telegram No. 58, my reasons for desiring a reference in any agreement to the Kroo labour question and to commerce generally.

8. *Hinterland of Ashanti.*

This discussion was difficult and unsatisfactory.

I asked his Excellency on what logical grounds he could claim to deprive us of territories we had secured by Treaties when we were giving up so much elsewhere. Why should the Dahomey "Hinterland" be almost indefinitely prolonged, and that of Ashanti curtailed? This latter country had also been brought into the British sphere in result of a campaign.

M. Hanotaux replied that if Her Majesty's Government claimed a "Hinterland" extending to the 11th parallel and eastwards to 0·30, Germany would claim a "Hinterland" for Togoland extending as far northwards. The result would be that French penetration from the north-west would be cramped and rendered difficult. If we claimed commercial privileges to the rear of Sierra Leone, why should we hem in France from the neutral zone, and exclude her from trade with that zone which she intended to recognize? This was a point to which the Colonial Office attached great importance.

His Excellency indicated a line to be drawn from a point near Fara to the north-west corner of the neutral zone as limiting our "Hinterland," but in a private conversation he said he would agree to a line drawn due westwards from the north-west corner of the zone, and ending at the 3rd meridian. I said I was unable to make, myself, any fresh proposal.

9. *Nile Valley Question.*

In regard to the Nile Valley question, on which I remarked the whole arrangement must necessarily hinge, it is superfluous (pending the receipt of your Lordship's instructions) to make any reference to the few observations which were exchanged. His Excellency repeated that he was ready to engage that France would not advance eastwards from the Congo watershed into the Nile Valley district, but observed that the question of recognition on the part of France of a British sphere in the Valley of the Nile would involve the examination of the confines of Egypt, and intrench upon the Egyptian question.

In conclusion, his Excellency reiterated, in the presence of the Representative of the Colonial Office, his desire to incur the responsibility, or establish the reputation, of being an Anglophil; but expressed a hope that Her Majesty's Government would have regard to the difficulties of his position. To employ his own expression, "il jouait sa tête," he was asking the French Colonial party to resign many of the most cherished objects of their ambition. In many of the territories to which claims were to be resigned French explorers alone had travelled, and had called the attention of the world to their value. I said that the ambitions of the Colonial party unfortunately extended far beyond the rights justified by Treaties.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

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* Italics in print.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Project of Bases for settlement of pending African Questions between Great Britain and France.

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1. *Question de la Compensation aux Missionnaires à Uganda.*

EN écartant la question des préjudices éprouvés par les dits missionnaires et des preuves qu'ils ont apportées que ces préjudices ont été causés par la faute des autorités Britanniques, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté leur accorde une indemnité de 10,000*l.*, vu qu'ils ont indubitablement souffert à la suite de la guerre.

2. *La Question de Delimitation pendante à Sierra-Leone.*

Les deux Gouvernements s'accordent à accepter une délimitation basée sur les ententes de 1889 et de 1891, selon ce qui a été convenu entre les Commissaires Britanniques et Français à Paris dans le courant de leurs délibérations.

Le Gouvernement Britannique reconnaît la ligne de partage des eaux du Niger à partir du 10^e parallèle jusqu'à la limite Franco-Libérienne dans la latitude de Tembe Kounda, comme ligne de séparation entre leurs possessions respectives en arrière de la Colonie Britannique de Sierra-Leone. Kalieri, dont la position n'est pas bien établie, reste à l'Angleterre. Une carte conforme sera jointe à l'arrangement.

3. *Les Collisions à Waïma et à N'Compan.*

Une collision regrettable a eu lieu entre les forces Britanniques et Françaises près de Waïma. Vu l'incertitude qui existe sur la position de Waïma, qui semble être éloigné de la sphère Française, mais qui sinon dans la sphère Britannique se trouverait, selon les termes du Traité Franco-Libérien, dans la sphère *Libérienne*, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique renonce à toute réclamation basée sur les grandes pertes éprouvées par la force Britannique, qui a été attaquée par ignorance par le détachement Français.

Par contraire, une expédition non armée d'indigènes de la sphère Britannique ayant subi, par suite d'un malentendu, près de N'Compan, sur territoire Français, le feu d'un détachement de police indigène Française, le Gouvernement de la Colonie Française accorderait un dédommagement aux familles des indigènes Anglais tués.

4. *Délimitation à l'Ouest du Niger.*

Quant à la délimitation des sphères Britanniques et Françaises à l'ouest du Niger, une ligne tracée à l'est de la frontière du Dahomey, en partant de la côte et atteignant le Niger au parallèle 12°, serait reconnue comme la ligne de séparation. Cette ligne de partage reconnaîtrait à la France une grande partie du Borgou et du Gourma, l'Angleterre renoncerait aux Traités qui pourraient avoir été conclus à l'ouest, et la France aux Traités qui pourraient avoir été conclus à l'est, de cette ligne.

5. *Interprétation de la Convention Franco-Anglaise de* 1890.

Selon la Convention Franco-Anglaise de 1890, une ligne serait tracée de Say à Barruwa, comme délimitant les sphères Anglaises et Françaises. Cette ligne, tout en conservant les extrémités ci-dessus indiquées de Say et Barruwa, et laissant par conséquent le Bornou dans la sphère Anglaise, serait tracée par les Commissaires de manière à comprendre dans la sphère Anglaise " tout ce qui équitablement appartient au Royaume de Sokoto," mais cette ligne serait toujours tracée de manière à ne pas diviser les tribus. Les lignes au sud-est de la sphère Anglaise, constatées par les arrangements Anglo-Allemands de 1886 et 1893, seraient reconnues par la France, de même que la ligne délimitant les sphères Françaises et Allemandes d'après l'arrangement de 1894 serait reconnue par l'Angleterre.

Les deux Puissances s'engagent réciproquement à n'exercer aucune action politique dans les régions comprises entre les lignes déterminées par les dits arrangements.

6. *Question Mizon.*

Toute discussion émanant de l'action du Lieutenant Mizon dans l'Adamoua cesserait des deux côtés.

En considération des sentiments mutuels manifestés dans le présent arrangement, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique mettra à la disposition du Gouvernement Français le "Sergent Malamine."

7. *Question Commerciale.*

Les Commissaires qui seraient nommés par les deux Gouvernements tomberaient d'accord sur un arrangement qui faciliterait le commerce des deux pays dans les régions en arrière de la Colonie Britannique de Sierra-Leone et dans la Colonie Française de la Côte d'Ivoire. Cette entente serait basée sur les points convenus entre son Excellence M. Hanotaux et Mr. Phipps.

Or else :—

Aussitôt la ratification du présent arrangement, des Commissaires seront désignés par les deux Gouvernements à l'effet de reviser l'Article VIII du Traité conclu entre la France et l'Almady-Samory, et d'établir les conditions du commerce dans la région voisine de la Colonie Anglaise de Sierra-Leone.

Le recrutement réciproque des indigènes se fera sans entraves . . . . . . dans les Colonies Anglaises de Lagos de la Côte d'Or et dans les Colonies Françaises du Dahomey et de la Côte d'Ivoire, selon l'entente entre les deux Gouvernements.

8. *Question du Hinterland d'Ashanti.*

9. *Question du Haut Nil, &c.*

No. 21.

The Earl of Kimberley to Mr. Phipps.

(No. 60. Africa.)
(Telegraphic.) P. *Foreign Office, October* 10, 1894.

YOU should endeavour to find out what it is exactly that is meant by M. Hanotaux' self-denying proposition contained in your despatch No. 263, Africa, of the 8th instant. It seems, on the face of it, to be an attempt to debar Her Majesty's Government from entering their own sphere on condition that it is not entered

by the French. Considering that the British sphere is recognized by three out of the four great African Powers, this appears to be a somewhat one-sided arrangement. It would, however, be well at any rate to find out what is the exact meaning of M. Hanotaux' proposal.

No. 22.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 12.)

(No. 270. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, October 11, 1894.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 266, Africa, of the 5th instant, forwarding to your Lordship a project, marked Private, which had been drawn up by me in order to assist the progress of the discussions upon African questions, I have the honour to inclose copy of a letter referring to it, also marked Private, from M. Hanotaux, together with copy of an answer which I returned.

Your Lordship will find marginal notes, which I have inserted in red ink* on the copy of his Excellency's letter, which explain allusions in it.

I may mention that during the conversation which I had in the afternoon with his Excellency upon this correspondence, he observed that if he had devoted so much of his time and his personal energies to this complicated negotiation, he had done so owing to a feeling that two nations which had so many delicate points of contact all over the world, and whose action must in so many cases be joint and cordial, ought not to embark upon such action under the influence of the irritation engendered by these unsettled African questions, and, as his Excellency expressed it, "ces velléités coloniales."

I have not to-day time at my disposal to report to your Lordship the language in which I pointed out to his Excellency how much, in my opinion, this irritation had been enhanced by the obstinacy of the French Colonial party, and its unwillingness to recognize existing facts when they interfered with its ambitions.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 22.

M. Hanotaux to Mr. Phipps.

Marginal Observations by Mr. Phipps.

Paris, le 10 *Octobre*, 1894.

(Particulière.)

Mon cher Ministre,

JE vous remercie bien de l'envoi que vous m'avez fait hier d'un premier avant-projet pour servir à l'étude de l'arrangement qui se prépare en ce moment au sujet de nos questions d'Afrique.

Naturellement j'aurai beaucoup de réserves à faire pour certains détails et nuances de forme. Mais cela viendra à son temps. Je veux seulement vous faire part aujourd'hui de quelques observations qui m'ont frappé à la première lecture. Je fais appel à votre mémoire pour reconnaître que les différents points que je vais

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* Printed in italics

aborder l'ont été réellement dans le sens qui est indiqué ci-dessous, au cours de nos conversations :—

1. En ce qui concerne le No. 4, nous n'avons, M. Haussmann et moi, examiné la ligne de l'Hinterland dans la direction du parallèle 12°, qu'en faisant observer très instamment que nous désirions que Niki fût reconnu à la France.

2. Pour le No. 5, je n'ai consenti à envisager l'idée de la rédaction que vous me proposez qu'à la condition qu'une ligne précise soit établie *sur une carte*, en tenant compte des indications et renseignements fournis par le Commandant Monteil, et nous avons déjà abordé ensemble la première étude du tracé de cette ligne pour laquelle vous m'avez demandé certains extraits des Rapports du Commandant Monteil. Pour la fin de cet Article il a été bien entendu entre nous que toute la région comprise entre la ligne de Barruwa d'une part et la ligne de démarcation Franco-Allemande de l'autre, restait dans la sphère de la France. Je dis cela parce que vous spécifiez le Bornou dans votre texte au lieu de vous contenter de la simple mention des lignes de démarcation.

3. En ce qui concerne le paragraphe 7 il me semble que nous sommes d'accord sur ce point, que ce qui est écrit en rouge "aussitôt la ratification, &c.," est une variante remplaçant ce qui est écrit à l'encre noire.

4. Sur le No. 8 nous vous avons exposé nos intentions de vive voix ; je n'y reviendrai pas ici.

5. Mais je tiens à bien établir, ainsi que je vous l'ai répété hier, devant M. Haussmann, ce qui s'est passé au sujet du Haut-Nil. Dans une première conversation *nous avons* abordé une idée qui paraissait pouvoir servir de base à une entente. Pour reprendre l'expression *dont je me suis servi dans une série d'hypothèses*, c'était celle d'un *désistement réciproque* avec une formule qui cependant laisserait ouvert le champ des négociations pour l'avenir. **Vous m'y avez ramené*, et dans l'examen que nous avons fait de cette base, nous sommes arrivés à certaines précisions. Si bien que dans notre entretien du 7 Octobre vous m'avez apporté un texte dont vous m'avez donné connaissance et sur lequel je n'ai fait aucune observation, l'heure de la discussion ne vous paraissant pas sonnée. Vous vous souvenez seulement qu'à diverses reprises, au cours de notre conversation, vous avez bien voulu, en réponse à des questions que je vous ai adressées, me dire que, dans votre pensée, les postes

Marginal Observations by Mr. Phipps.

1. *This was all duly recorded in my despatch No.* 266. *I did not insert it in the Project as sent to his Excellency, because I could not admit this new pretension.*

2. *This I admit, and referred to the necessity of maps being annexed in my private letter to Sir H. P. Anderson. I specified Bornu remaining to us as a counterpoise to part of Borgu, &c., going to France.*

Here his Excellency is referring to the northern and eastern portion of Lake Tchad belonging to the French sphere. That seems to me no affair of ours.

3. *Quite correct.*

4. *This is explained in my No.* 266.

5. *As to this point, I had to return the letter to his Excellency for correction. He had implied that I had "abordé" the idea of a Self-denying Agreement, but I convinced him that he had done so. The words underlined in pencil he had inserted by his Secretary in my presence yesterday in place of the inaccurate expressions at first employed.*

When his Excellency refers to "notre entretien du 7 Octobre," he is alluding to my having read him the substance of my telegram No. 49 *of the 5th October, which I did in order to absolutely exclude any misapprehension.*

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* See second paragraph of my No. 263.

où dans notre hypothèse, au delà desquels l'Angleterre n'exercerait pas son action, sont ceux des régions d'Ouganda et de l'Ounyoro, où l'on sait dans le public et en France notamment, que vos agents sont installées, et "qu'il n'y aurait pas de surprises" dans cette négociation.

Si j'ai relevé ces divers points, c'est que j'ai dû, de mon côté, faire consulter par lettres mon collègue des Colonies absent de Paris et que je veux éviter par dessus tout, qu'il se produise quelque malentendu au dernier moment.

Je vous verrai d'ailleurs cet après-midi, et je reste dans le sincère espoir de nous voir bientôt sortis de cette dure négociation. Je crois que nous aurons donné l'un et l'autre des preuves incontestables d'un grand désir d'entente et d'un bon vouloir qu'aucune difficulté n'a rebuté. Mais surtout j'ai apprécié dans toute cette période votre tact et votre bonne grâce; il est impossible que nous oublions, ni vous ni moi, les relations parfois laborieuses, mais toujours courtoises et cordiales qui sont ainsi établies entre nous.

(Signé) G. HANOTAUX.

Marginal Observations by Mr. Phipps.

What M. Hanotaux means is, that there would be no "surprises," and that during the negotiation we should not have advanced our posts further northwards than we were known to have done.

Inclosure 2 in No. 22.

Mr. Phipps to M. Hanotaux.

(Particulière.)

Mon cher Ministre, *Paris, le* 10 *Octobre*, 1894.

UN mot pour vous dire, de suite, que vos souvenirs quant au langage employé par vous-même et par M. Haussmann sont parfaitement exacts quant aux paragraphes 1, 2, 3, et 4 de votre lettre. Je l'ai déjà constaté dans mon Rapport.

Ils le sont également dans le No. 5, sauf un point.

C'était le 29 Septembre quand nous avons parlé de la note de M. Ribot de Décembre 1890—que je vous ai demandé quelles étaient les compensations dans le voisinage du Haut-Nil auquel vous visiez? Dans le courant de votre réponse vous avez prononcé la phrase "clause de désintéressement."

Le 5 Octobre je vous ai adressé la demande: Qu'est-ce que vous entendez par "clause de désintéressement" ou "self-denying agreement?"

Nous en parlerons cet après-midi, mais je tiens seulement à constater que je n'ai pas moi, le premier, articulé cette phrase.

Je suis bien touché et reconnaissant des sentiments exprimés dans le dernier paragraphe de votre lettre, et je n'ai jamais, dans ma correspondance—tant officielle que particulière—avec mon Gouvernement, manqué de mettre en relief votre attitude de cordialité et de franchise.

(Signé) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 23.

Mr. Phipps to Foreign Office.—(Received October 17.)

(Private.)

My dear Anderson, *Paris, October* 15, 1894.

I PROCEED to answer simultaneously your letters of the 9th and 12th. As you observe, a review of the situation is now considered necessary, and you must "stand still

and consider," but it will not be regarded as intrusive that I should make a few remarks on your letters, and as to the possible contingencies in case of a change of Government here.

1. As to the strength of our position.

In Borgu, &c., that is, of course, incontestable, but in order to arrive at a calm solution instead of an irritating one, my impression is that Hanotaux would be glad to prove to his "Colonies" by the exhibition of our Treaties that their claims are untenable. The manner in which he put forward his Nikki claim made me think it was done under pressure from Delcassé, for it must be remembered that the line first proposed by them giving obliquely north-east to Gomba would have left us Nikki. Their argument now is, "Take two of the capital towns and leave us one." Nikki will not, in my opinion, make them upset the arrangement proposed by us.

2. As to the Say-Barruwa arrangement not being of much importance to us now.

Would not public opinion in France and the Chambers contend that we had no right to "take the law into our own hands," since the Agreement says, "The line to be determined by the Commissioners to be appointed."

Now, those Commissioners have not yet arrived at a "complete agreement upon all details of the line" (see succeeding paragraph), but still "the Agreement between the two Governments as to the general delimitation above set forth shall nevertheless remain binding."

As Commissioner, I conceive that if we wish to "passer outre" and still to regard the Agreement "as binding," we must first formally establish that we have "failed to arrive at an agreement."

My belief is that the French Commissioners, basing their contention on Monteil's evidence, would claim the border districts I enumerated, but would not attempt to contest Bornou on "the triangle," or the loop of the River Sokoto.

But ought we not to make the position we take up a legal one?

3. The "Hinterland" of Ashanti.

My belief is, that the French would give way if we gave them the smallest access to the neutral zone from the north. My arguments last Wednesday, founded on "First come first served," seemed to make an impression; also the commercial point brought forward by Lord Kimberley more forcibly than I had already put it.

4. The Nile Valley.

This is, of course, a point I refer to with much hesitation. I do not quite agree with the phrase in your letter, that Hanotaux' "projet de désintéressement" means that France has as good a right to go into the Nile Basin as we have.

In theory, they possibly think so as regards access to it from the west or the south. But Hanotaux seemed to be ready (though Delcassé may still put in his oar as in the case of Nikki) to agree that the Nile Valley is without the French sphere of influence, and not to demand from us a declaration that it is "without" ours. They declare that they respect Egyptian rights, and pretend they only wish us to do the same. But, of course, he wants to be able to tell his Chamber that we will not advance beyond our actual posts without an understanding with France, and this, I fancy, would not suit us. By negotiation, however, this difficulty may be surmounted.

What, in fact, do Hanotaux' declarations in the Chamber amount to?

1. He quoted the Hatti Shereef of the 13th February, 1841, as to the four provinces. He is now convinced that that did not apply to our "Anglo-Congolese sphere."

2. He said that the Equatorial Provinces were an integral part of the Ottoman Empire. He is now convinced that the guarantee of 1856 does not apply to them.

3. He declared that the Anglo-Congolese Convention as menacing the integrity of the Ottoman Empire was null and void. He has got the Congolese out of the way, and has proofs that we do not menace that integrity.

Finally, he has sought "dans le domaine de l'action diplomatique" a solution "de commun accord," viz., with us.

From all I can learn from a foreigner who is in close intercourse with the Colonial party, and who talks over questions with a Frenchman, a member of it, that party does not wish to develop the actual Colonial possessions of France beyond the limits they consider covered by their explorations; and that party wishes for a settlement with England. It objects, for instance, to the Timbuctoo expedition and to the prolongation of the war with Samory, and my informant believes if Hanotaux can tell the Chamber that he has insured respect for Egyptian rights and made an Agreement with England, involving concessions and counter-concessions, that they will not press hardly on him. As he said, Hanotaux' position depends on England, and what he has been able to do with us.

5. The position of the negotiations as affected by a possible change of Government here.

Not merely the "man in the street," but sound-headed financial people talk of the Government possibly not passing "la première quinzaine de la Chambre."

What should we have in its place?

An entirely Radical Ministry seems out of the question.

A Ministry with a Radical tinge; that is, a reconstructed Ministry would probably keep on Hanotaux, who has one foot in that camp. If we had Waldeck Rousseau, who was a *collaborateur* of Gambetta and Jules Ferry, and who, recently elected by a great majority, may be the coming man, he would probably keep on Hanotaux.

But we might get a Minister of Foreign Affairs like Develle of the "médecin tant mieux" type, who would simply follow a dilatory policy, or make us promises which he could not keep, and which would be rejected by the Chamber. If we had a Radical of the Goblet type, he would have all the specialists in the Chamber against him, prompted by Hanotaux and Delcassé, if he made an arrangement. If he stiffened against us, into what condition would our relations get?

Minister Ressmann and all those with whom I am on any terms of confidence are of opinion that foreign Representatives would lose by a change at the Foreign Office, and even the Belgian Bergens, who has long experience here, does not share the opinions held about Hanotaux by Comte de Grelle and at Brussels generally. Though, in many respects, he has shown himself impracticable with us, and is a very tough nut to crack—to use Lord Rosebery's words—we might go from bad to worse.

As to the policy of an arrangement at all I can, of course, say nothing.

Ever yours sincerely,
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

P.S.—I have no time to keep copy of this letter.

E. C. H. P.

No. 24.

Mr. Phipps to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received October 27.)

(No. 280. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord, *Paris, October 24, 1894.*

I THINK it is my duty to report that in a final conversation which I had with M. Hanotaux at his customary reception to-day, his Excellency repeated his regrets that the discussions on African questions had been even temporarily interrupted, as he had fears that the specialists in the Colonial Office, over whom he had with great difficulty been enabled to exercise his personal influence, were to some extent slipping out of his hands ("m'échappent"). Had we been able to strike at the psychological moment, and before the Colonial Office had time to discuss matters with those who held even more advanced views, he would have had more confidence in his power to control these influences. The existence of these unfortunate and irritating questions, which he was so desirous to dismiss, poisoned the relations of the two Governments on all other matters on which they were engaged elsewhere. The newspapers had for instance taken hold of the question of the reorganization of the Ministries at Cairo, and had exaggerated its importance.

I said that I had with regret read in the newspapers that M. Cogordan was opposing the reorganization of the Ministry of the Interior at Cairo, a matter which entirely concerned the internal administration for the benefit of Egypt, and with regard to which, as I understood, there was no difference of opinion between the Khedive or Nubar Pasha and Lord Cromer. I could not believe that M. Cogordan had received instructions as stated.

M. Hanotaux said that M. Cogordan had as yet not even seen the Khedive, and that he did not wish to enter into any discussion of that question; he had merely instanced it as an example of the manner in which this open sore had a reaction on the relations of the two countries. When it was healed there would, he hoped, be a sensible change.

It could not fail to strike me that there was something significant in his Excellency's entirely spontaneous and almost gratuitous allusion to this question, especially when taken in connection with the language which he employed as reported in my despatch No. 270, Africa, of the 11th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 25.

Memorandum by Sir P. Anderson.

M. HANOTAUX, in speaking of the "confines of Egypt," refers to the marked paragraph of Article I of the Anglo-German Agreement (p. 5). That paragraph defines the frontier of the sphere east of the Nile. Starting from the mouth of the Juba it skirts the Italian sphere in Gallaland and Abyssinia, and marches with the frontier of Abyssinia till it reaches the confines of Egypt.

It was subsequently more precisely defined in the marked passage of the Anglo-Italian Agreement, which makes it follow the 35th meridian to its intersection with the Blue Nile.

To the west of the Nile nothing was said about the confines of Egypt. Our sphere comprised "the western watershed of the basin of the Upper Nile" (p. 6, marked passage). In the Anglo-Congolese Agreement we defined the limits of that western watershed.

M. Hanotaux' curiosity about the "confines of Egypt" should not, therefore, be difficult to satisfy. He can be referred to the Hatti-Sherif of 1841, on which, in his speech, he vested the rights of Turkey, and which, in fact, is referred to in the Khedivial investitures. That deed mentioned Darfur, Kordofan, Sennaar, and their dependencies. In 1841 the "Equatorial provinces" were unknown. East of the Nile the intersection of the 35th meridian with the Blue Nile fairly represents the southern limit of Sennaar. West of the river the 10th parallel, slightly diverted to the north of Fashoda, fairly represents the southern limit of Kordofan.

But he is dealing with the Anglo-Congolese Agreement, which does not affect the territory east of the Nile. As regards that Agreement, there is no question of the "confines of Egypt;" we have only to define the "western watershed of the basin of the Upper Nile," which, for the purposes of the definition of the sphere, we have done with sufficient accuracy.

We should on the whole, I think, be justified in saying that we have observed the limits of Turkish and Egyptian rights specified in internationally recognized Acts; and that, as regards territory not so specified, but temporarily occupied and then abandoned by Egypt, we recognize the contingency of the resumption of such abandoned rights.

Foreign Office, November 2, 1894. H. P. A.

No. 26.

The Earl of Kimberley to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 390. Africa.)
My Lord, *Foreign Office, November* 3, 1894.

HER Majesty's Government have had under their consideration the despatches in which Mr. Phipps has reported the progress of the negotiations, carried on by him with M. Hanotaux during your Excellency's absence, for the settlement of various African questions at issue between this country and France.

As you are aware, the concessions which Her Majesty's Government were willing to make in West Africa were dependent upon a satisfactory arrangement with France as to the British sphere of influence in the basin of the Nile. If no arrangement can be arrived at as to the sphere, it will be necessary to reconsider the terms we have offered.

Before, therefore, any further step can be taken with regard to the West African questions, it must be ascertained whether an agreement can be arrived at with respect to the Nile sphere.

Mr. Phipps reported in his despatch No. 263 of the 5th October, that M. Hanotaux said that he thought the question "could for the moment be left at rest by a mutual déclaration de désintéressement," and on Mr. Phipps observing that he could not conceive any such arrangement possible unless his Excellency would undertake that France would not advance beyond the watershed of the Nile, M. Hanotaux replied that "such an understanding might possibly be given if on our side we engaged not to extend our occupation beyond its existing limits."

I need scarcely say that Her Majesty's Government could not on their part enter into such an engagement, which would amount, practically, to the abandonment by them of a large portion of the British sphere which has been formally recognized by Germany and Italy, and recently by the Congo State.

In case, however, the French Government display an insurmountable reluctance to formally recognize our sphere, but should be disposed to give an assurance that they would not advance beyond the watershed of the Nile, we on our side might take act of such an assurance, and thus arrive at a practical settlement.

With regard to the difficulty which M. Hanotaux again referred to in the conversation reported in your telegram No. 58 of the 31st October as standing in the way of a recognition of the British sphere from the absence of a definition of the expression "confines of Egypt" used in the Anglo-German Agreement, Mr. Phipps has already explained, as reported in his despatch No. 247 of the 22nd September, that west of the Nile there is no mention in the Anglo-German Agreement of the confines of Egypt.

The northern limit of the sphere, as will be seen by reference to Article II of the Agreement with the King of the Belgians, is the 10th parallel of north latitude, with a slight deflection to the north of Fashoda. East of the Nile the northernmost point of the sphere was defined by the Agreement with Italy as the intersection of the 35th meridian of longitude with the Blue Nile.

It seems, however, likely, from the language hitherto held by M. Hanotaux, that your Excellency will not find him disposed to enter into any agreement as to our sphere which could be accepted by Her Majesty's Government, and that his real view is to be gathered from his earlier statement reported in Mr. Phipps' above-mentioned despatch, that "he, candidly speaking, could not see why any such pressing necessity existed for at once settling finally the Nile Valley question."

Your Excellency should therefore avoid pressing him too strongly on this subject, as the result might be that he would be led to make more definite declarations, denying our right to the sphere, instead of leaving the matter, as he appears at present inclined to do, open for possible negotiations at some future time.

As regards the questions in West Africa, whilst it must be clearly understood that, if they are to be treated separately from the questions as to the Nile sphere, we are not bound by the offers we have made, we should be prepared to consider each question on its merits in a friendly spirit, with a sincere desire to arrive at a settlement of them.

I am, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 27.

The Earl of Kimberley to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 391. Africa.)
My Lord,
Foreign Office, November 5, 1894.

WITH reference to my despatch No. 390, Africa, of the 3rd instant, I have to state that your Excellency is authorized to proceed at once with the negotiations for the settlement of the Sierra Leone frontier delimitation on the bases agreed to between M. Hanotaux and Mr. Phipps, as reported in Mr. Phipps' No. 266, Africa, of the 9th ultimo.

The Director of Military Intelligence has been requested to hold an officer in readiness to proceed to Paris whenever your Excellency may desire his presence, to assist in the final drafting of the words of the Agreement and in the preparation of the map to be attached to it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 28.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received November* 10.)

(No. 293. Africa. Confidential.)

My Lord,

Paris, November 7, 1894.

IMMEDIATELY on receipt of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch No. 390, Africa, of the 3rd November, I waited upon M. Hanotaux by appointment.

I began the conversation by informing his Excellency that I had duly acquainted your Lordship with the conciliatory and friendly terms in which he had alluded at our previous interview to the negotiations which were pending between England and France, not only in relation to matters in Africa, but in other parts of the world; that I had conveyed to you his anxiety for a speedy conclusion of the Sierra Leone delimitation; and that I had also submitted to your Lordship the question he had addressed to me as to what were the northern limits of our sphere of influence in the upper valley of the Nile.

In reply, I had been requested by your Lordship to reciprocate in the fullest terms his amicable sentiments; to inform him that, as a further proof of the friendly feelings of Her Majesty's Government, you were quite prepared to acquiesce in his desire for the speedy delimitation of the Sierra Leone boundary; and that, with regard to his request to know what we considered to be the northern limit of our sphere of influence in the valley of the Upper Nile, I could only repeat what I thought had already been indicated to him by Mr. Phipps, namely, that on the east of the Nile its northernmost point, as defined by our Agreement with Italy, was the intersection of the 35th meridian of longitude with the Blue Nile; and that on the west of the river it extended, according to Article II of our Agreement with the King of the Belgians, to the 10th parallel of north latitude, with a slight deflection to the north of Fashoda.

Having thus replied to his inquiries as to the northern limits of the English sphere, I asked M. Hanotaux whether he could give me any analogous information in regard to the views held by the French Government in reference to the limits of their sphere in the valley of the Congo. His Excellency replied that he was not in a position to do so at present.

He then reverted to one of his previous conversations with Mr. Phipps, in which a project of mutual "désintéressement" in reference to the Bahr-el-Ghazal had been mooted, the French undertaking upon their part not to overpass the watershed between the Congo and the Nile, if we on our side would enter into an analogous engagement not to push further north than our present line of posts. Mr. Phipps had been good enough to place in his hands a paper in which such an arrangement had been outlined, and as he was under the impression that it was one which might meet the views of Her Majesty's Government, it had not occurred to him to occupy himself with any other combination.

On this I said that his Excellency seemed to be under a very great misapprehension as to Mr. Phipps' attitude in reference to this part of the question. Mr. Phipps had assured me that such a proposition had never emanated from him, and that in the paper referred to (a telegram addressed to your Lordship) he had merely endeavoured to secure an accurate record of M. Hanotaux' own views, for the information of your Lordship. I further added that Her Majesty's Government could never acquiesce in such a proposal, as it would amount practically to the abandonment by them of a large portion of the British sphere which has been formally recognized by Germany and Italy, and recently by the Congo State. M. Hanotaux at once admitted that he had not been entitled to bring in the name of Her Majesty's Government, and that, even in regard to what might have fallen from Mr. Phipps, he could not pretend that there had been anything approaching to an agreement, but as Mr. Phipps had not appeared averse to discuss the idea, he had concluded that Her Majesty's Government might show a similar disposition. I again assured his Excellency that he was under a mistaken impression in reference to the character of the incident, which Mr. Phipps regarded from exactly the opposite point of view, namely, as a proposal emanating from M. Hanotaux, upon which he himself had thrown cold water, although he had not refused to acquaint your Lordship with its nature.

M. Hanotaux then proceeded, in reference to my observation—"that anything approaching to an engagement upon our part to debar ourselves from entering into the English sphere in the Nile Valley except after negotiating on the subject with France would be tantamount to annulling the chief clauses in our three Conventions with Italy, Germany, and the Congo State"—to argue that it was scarcely reasonable to take such a view of the matter; that, as for our Convention with Italy, it merely affected the territory on the east side of the Nile, with which France had no concern; that in the German Convention there was no mention made of Fashoda, and that its Signatories were at the time only preoccupied with the demarcation of their respective limits in reference to the Sultanate of Zanzibar; and that, with regard to the Congo Convention, in which alone the extent of our sphere was defined and delimitated on the north, the other party to it had rendered its practical application inoperative.

In reference to this latter observation, I ventured to remind his Excellency that we had declined to take any official cognizance of what had passed between the King of the Belgians and France; nor had it affected either the validity or the vitality of our Agreement with His Majesty as far as it relates to the recognition of our sphere by the Congo State.

The conversation then proceeded for a short time along the well-worn channels with which your Lordship is already acquainted from Mr. Phipps' able despatches, during the course of which it became evident that M. Hanotaux was not prepared to adhere to the original proposals which had emanated from the French Government for the settlement of all our African questions *en bloc*, including that affecting the valley of the Upper Nile, but that he was determined, while anxious to take advantage of the concessions we had shown an inclination to make in the west, to refuse us the *quid pro quo* in the east in view of which they had been offered. Nor did he seem inclined to make any declaration as to the Congo watershed being the limit of the French sphere. Under these circumstances, I thought it better to conclude this part of the discussion by a few amicable observations, expressing my regret that we had not been able to arrive at an agreement on this particular point. M. Hanotaux expressed similar sentiments, and repeated an observation he had already made both to me and to Mr. Phipps on former occasions, that, inasmuch as the King of the Belgians, whose proceedings had brought this particular controversy to its present acute stage, had retired again into the background, the matter might very well be allowed to go to sleep again, in which view I expressed a certain amount of acquiescence.

Turning then to the other African matters of controversy between us, I told M. Hanotaux that, although, of course, he could not now expect us to make the sacrifices to which we had recently shown a willingness to submit in the hopes of arriving at a complete agreement both in the east and in the west, I had been authorized to assure him that we should be ready to discuss each of them separately and upon its individual merits in a liberal and conciliatory spirit. M. Hanotaux desired me to convey his acknowledgments to your Lordship for these friendly assurances, but added, just as I was leaving, that, though he had expressed himself with a certain explicitness in reference to the matter which had formed the principal subject of our conversation that day, he would wish me to consider his reply as still in suspense until he had communicated with his colleagues, when he would again ask me to come and see him.

I have no doubt, both from what fell from M. Hanotaux to-day, and on previous occasions in his conversations with Mr. Phipps, that the desire of the French Government is to connect their Congo possessions with the Nile if they can possibly manage it. The expression "partition" has already slipped from M. Hanotaux in an interview with Mr. Phipps, and the pointed way in which he implied that we were free to do what we liked on the east bank of the river seems to belong to the same order of ideas.

I may add that during the course of our interview M. Hanotaux repeatedly referred to himself as in no sense an advocate of a forward colonial policy, and as continually trying to curb and discourage the extravagant pretensions of the Colonial party in Parliament.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

No. 29.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received November 10.)

(No. 296. Africa. Confidential.)

Paris, November 9, 1894.

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a despatch which has been addressed to me by Mr. Phipps on the subject of M. Hanotaux' proposal in regard to a possible Self-denying Agreement between Great Britain and France as to the occupation of the British sphere under the Anglo-German Convention of 1890.

I have, &c.

(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

Inclosure in No. 29.

Mr. Phipps to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(Confidential.)

Paris, November 9, 1894.

My Lord,

MY attention was called, when in London, by the Earl of Kimberley to a passage in your Excellency's telegram No. 58 of the 31st ultimo, to the effect that M. Hanotaux had tried to represent that, during the course of the negotiations which I was then conducting here, a proposal had emanated from me to the following effect:—

That if France would undertake not to advance beyond the Congo watershed, England would not occupy the region covered by the Anglo-German Convention without previous negotiation with France.

Your Excellency thereupon stated that this was an entire misapprehension on the part of his Excellency, and I venture to point out how entirely correct your Excellency's statement can be proved to be.

M. Hanotaux already, on a previous occasion, fell into this error, and in consequence of my representations voluntarily rectified it, as explained in my despatch No. 270 of the 11th instant. In the original letter, which he addressed to me on the 10th October, I found the following passage:—

"Dans une première conversation vous avez abordé une idée qui vous paraissait pouvoir servir de base à une entente. Pour reprendre l'expression initiale, c'était celle d'un désistement réciproque avec une formule qui cependant laisserait ouvert le champ des négociations pour l'avenir. Dans l'examen attentif que nous avons fait de cette base, nous sommes arrivés à certaines précisions. Si bien que dans notre entretien du 7 Octobre vous m'avez apporté un texte dont vous m'avez donné connaissance et sur lequel je n'ai fait aucune observation, l'heure de la discussion ne nous paraissant pas sonnée."

The same afternoon I took back to M. Hanotaux his letter in order to point out to his Excellency that he had involuntarily misrepresented my language as I had reported it to Lord Kimberley in my despatch No. 263 of the 5th October, and reminded him that he himself had first employed, on the 29th September (see my despatch No. 255), the expression "Self-denying Agreement," and that I had consequently (after receiving Lord Kimberley's telegram No. 57, Africa) asked his Excellency to explain what he meant by the phrase.

M. Hanotaux, after a brief discussion as to dates of interviews, entirely admitted that the rectification I asked for was justified, and in my presence instructed his Private Secretary to alter the original letter in the sense I desired, as follows:—

"Dans une première conversation *nous avons* abordé une idée qui paraissait pouvoir servir de base à une entente. Pour reprendre l'expression dont *je* me suis servi dans une série d'hypothèses, *c'était celle d'un désistement réciproque*," &c. (see inclosure in my No. 270).

I also pointed out to his Excellency that I had never submitted to him "un texte," but that I had, on the contrary, merely read to him the substance of the telegram which I had addressed to Lord Kimberley (No. 49 of the 5th October) as supplying a résumé of the conversation, and that I had told his Excellency that though I could not imagine for a moment that Her Majesty's Government would agree to his hypothetical proposal, I had embodied it, owing to the succeeding phrase: "any proposal from your Lordship or any modifications within these broad lines would be considered by his Excellency."

I venture to think that I have clearly established the fact that the phrase "Self-denying Agreement" never emanated from me, but I conceive that, conducting as I was the preparatory negotiations, it was not my duty to close the door peremptorily to all eventual negotiations which might be founded on his Excellency's proposal, with the latitude afforded by the phrase which I have just quoted.

The solution at which I was aiming was the following one:—

Her Majesty's Government, while asking for the recognition of the British sphere under the Anglo-German Agreement of 1890, had declared that they regarded the rights of Egypt over the Equatorial Provinces as being only in suspense.

I hoped, therefore, that M. Hanotaux would (1) undertake that the French sphere of influence was restricted to the Congo watershed; (2) that both Powers would declare that they respected Egyptian possessions.

Her Majesty's Government would in that case not have been precluded, under the pressure of eventual possible necessities, from temporarily occupying the Nile Valley or any portion of it.

At that stage of the negotiations, it was clear that M. Hanotaux was unwilling unconditionally to acknowledge the British sphere, and I was obviously not desirous to press him to do so, and elicit from him a positive refusal from which he would have been unable to recede.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. C. H. PHIPPS.

No. 30.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Kimberley.—(*Received November* 28.)

(No. 309. Africa.)
My Lord, *Paris, November* 26, 1894.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch No. 391, Africa, I have the honour to inclose copy of a note from M. Hanotaux stating that the French Government is ready to proceed with the delimitation of the Sierra Leone boundary, and that his Excellency has appointed M. Benoit, Minister Plenipotentiary, Director of the Protectorate Department in the French Foreign Office, and M. Haussmann, of the Colonial Office, to act as Commissioners under the Anglo-French Agreement of 1890.

M. Benoit has informed Mr. Phipps that he will be prepared to proceed with the duties of the Commission, including the question above referred to, on or after the 10th proximo.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

Inclosure in No. 30.

M. Hanotaux to the Marquis of Dufferin.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Paris, November* 20, 1894.

PAR une lettre du 8 de ce mois, votre Excellence a bien voulu m'informer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique était disposé dès maintenant à ouvrir à Paris les négociations pour la délimitation de la frontière de Sierra-Leone sur les bases qui ont été convenues entre Mr. Phipps et moi pendant la Conférence qui a eu lieu le 9 Octobre dernier.

En remerciant votre Excellence de cette communication, je m'empresse de lui faire connaître que je suis également disposé, en ce qui me concerne, à donner les instructions nécessaires pour que les Commissaires chargés, conformément à l'Arrangement du 5 Août, 1890, de régler les questions de délimitation prévues par le dit Arrangement, reprennent leurs travaux, et que j'ai désigné, pour représenter mon Département dans la dite Commission, M. G. Benoit, Ministre Plénipotentiaire, chargé du Service des Protectorats.

J'ajoute qu'en raison de l'état d'avancement des travaux relatifs à la délimitation de Sierra-Leone, j'ai la confiance qu'il sera possible de procéder dans un très bref délai à la signature d'un Arrangement sur les bases arrêtées dans les réunions antérieures des Commissaires des deux pays.

Agreéz, &c.
(Signé) G. HANOTAUX.

No. 31.

The Earl of Kimberley to the Marquis of Dufferin.

(No. 415. Africa.)
My Lord,
Foreign Office, November 30, 1894.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch No. 309, Africa, of the 26th instant, inclosing copy of a note in which, with reference to your Excellency's announcement that Her Majesty's Government were willing to proceed at once with the negotiation for the delimitation of the Sierra Leone frontier, M. Hanotaux expresses his readiness to give the necessary instructions for the resumption of the labours of the Commissioners intrusted, under the arrangement of the 5th August, 1890, with the settlement of the delimitation questions dealt with in that arrangement, and that he has nominated M. G. Benoit, &c., to represent his Department on the said Commission.

I have to request your Excellency to state to M. Hanotaux that it must be clearly understood that the only delimitation with which Her Majesty's Government are at present prepared to proceed is that relating to the frontier of Sierra Leone, which formed the subject of Article II and Annex I of the Arrangement of the 10th August, 1889.

I am, &c.
(Signed) KIMBERLEY.

No. 32.

The Marquis of Dufferin to the Earl of Kimberley.—(Received December 7.)

(No. 318. Africa.)
My Lord,
Paris, December 5, 1894.

DURING my interview with M. Hanotaux this afternoon I told him that I had not failed to inform your Lordship of his having designated a new Commissioner for the delimitation of Sierra Leone. I added that of course it was clearly understood that this was the only delimitation with which, for the present, we were prepared to proceed. M. Hanotaux accepted this announcement without any further remark than that he hoped that the other questions in which we were mutually interested in Africa might be taken up one by one at a later period.

I have, &c.
(Signed) DUFFERIN AND AVA.

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